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Walking the Edge of Death: An Annotated
Bibliography on Juveniles, the Mentally Ill,
the Mentally Retarded and the Death Penalty
SUSAN M. BOLAND*

The death penalty is not so monolithic as it seems at first glance. A
storm of debate has centered around the application of this, the harshest
criminal penalty of all, to the mentally ill, mentally retarded, and juveniles.
They are our most vulnerable and least culpable citizens.
This bibliography consists of annotated references to periodical articles,
books, Web sites, and Supreme Court cases that examine the application of the
death penalty to juveniles, the mentally ill, and the mentally retarded. It does
not include newspaper articles, popular magazines, Web sites that offer no
substantive content, or materials that are unobtainable from major research
libraries. Due to the vast quantity of material on the death penalty, this
bibliography is not comprehensive. Omissions do not necessarily reflect a
qualitative judgment about the material omitted. The bibliography has been
organized under three subject headings: I. Juveniles, II. Mentally Ill, and I.
Mentally Retarded. The three subject headings are further subdivided into A.
Supreme Court Cases and B. Books, Articles, and Web Sites.
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I. JUVENILES
A. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES

Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 (1978).
This case involves a defendant who was sixteen-years-old at the time of
the crime and who was labeled as mentally deficient, emotionally
unstable, and immature for his age. The Ohio death penalty statute
strictly limited the mitigating factors which could be considered.
Certiorari was granted to determine whether the Ohio statute violated the
defendant's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments because
it prevented the sentencer from considering the particular circumstances
of his crime and his character as mitigating factors. The Court vacated
and remanded the case because the Ohio statute did not permit the
individualized consideration of mitigating factors required by the Eight
and Fourteenth Amendments, as held in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586
(1978). Justices Blackmun and Marshall concurred.
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
This case involved a defendant who was sixteen-years-old at the time of
the crime. On petition to the Supreme Court, the defendant argued that
the death sentence, under the particular circumstances of this case, was
excessive punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The defendant also
argued that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited the death
penalty for sixteen-year-olds. The Supreme Court vacated the death
sentence and remanded the case because the trial court refused to consider
the defendant's unhappy upbringing and emotional disturbance as
mitigating evidence. This meant the death sentence was imposed without
the individualized consideration of mitigating factors required by the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments as held by Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978). The Court saw this mitigating evidence as particularly
relevant due to the defendant's youth. Justice O'Connor wrote a
concurring opinion. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun,
and Rehnquist dissented. They criticized the majority for addressing the
mitigation issue which was raised for the first time in the brief to the
Supreme Court. They also criticized the majority for trying to dictate the
weight that state courts must attach to mitigating circumstances.
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
Two cases were consolidated for this decision, Stanford v. Kentucky and
Wilkins v. Missouri. One defendant was seventeen and the other was
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sixteen. The question on appeal was the constitutionality of executing
offenders under eighteen. The Supreme Court rejected the petitioners'
Eighth Amendment arguments and affirmed the state court decisions. The
plurality, made up of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices Scalia, White, and
Kennedy, looked first at the evolving standards of decency. The plurality
declined to look at legislative enactments that did not deal with capital
punishment and at those states without capital punishment. The plurality
also rejected public opinion polls, interest groups, and the views of the
international community. Furthermore, the plurality rejected the second
part of the traditional Eighth Amendment analysis, the proportionality
test. The plurality held there was no national consensus that sixteen-andseventeen-year-olds should not be executed and thus such executions do
not violate the Eighth Amendment. Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring
opinion, where she found no national consensus prohibiting imposition of
the death penalty on sixteen-or-seventeen-year-olds but did state the Court
needed to conduct a proportionality analysis. The dissent, made up of
Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, applied the evolving
standards of decency test and came to the opposite conclusion of the
plurality. They also applied a proportionality analysis and found juveniles
sufficiently less culpable than adults so that the death penalty was
disproportionate. They stated that executing offenders for a crime
committed when below eighteen was cruel and unusual punishment.
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
In this case, for the first time, the Supreme Court tackled head-on the
issue of whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of
juveniles. The defendant, William Wayne Thompson, was fifteen-yearsold when the crime was committed. The plurality, made up of Justices
Stevens, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, employed an evolving
standards of decency test for the first part of its analysis. The plurality
looked at legislative enactments, jury determinations, and views of the
international community and religious and political leaders. For the
second part of its analysis, the plurality looked at the proportionality of
the punishment to the personal culpability of the defendant. The
plurality held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of a
person under sixteen at the time of the offense. Justice O'Connor
concurred in the opinion. She stated that although a national consensus
prohibiting the execution of persons under sixteen probably existed,
better evidence was needed. However, she found that due to the nature
of the death penalty, defendants under sixteen may not be executed
pursuant to a death penalty statute that gives no minimum age. Justices
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Scalia, Rehnquist, and White dissented. They applied the evolving
standards of decency test but came to the opposite conclusion. They
rejected the proportionality test.
B. ARTICLES, BOOKS, AND WEB SITES

ACLU, Ranks of Youth on Death Row Growing,athttp://www.aclu.org/news/
2000/w082200a.html (Aug. 22, 2000).
This web page reports on the execution of Alexander Williams, a
juvenile on Georgia's death row. The report discusses the growing
number of juveniles on death row and the circumstances surrounding
Alexander Williams' case.
Rolayne Ailts, Note, Thompson v. Oklahoma: An Analysis of the Death
Penalty as Applied to Juvenile Offenders, 34 S.D. L. REV. 762 (1989).
After an overview of the juvenile justice system and death penalty
jurisprudence, the author critiques the evolving standards of decency
analysis in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). The author
argues the evolving standards of decency analysis is too uncertain and
susceptible to different interpretations. The article suggests a more
consistent approach would be the disproportionality analysis. The author
concludes that under a disproportionality analysis, the juvenile death
penalty is always disproportionate because minors are always less
responsible for their crimes than adults. The author also looks at the
goals of capital punishment and concludes neither retribution nor
deterrence supports juvenile executions.
(James R. Acker et al.
1998).
eds.,
This book looks at the experiment of capital punishment post-Furman v.
Georgia,408 U.S. 238 (1972), and discusses its failures. The chapters,
which are written by different authors, examine: public opinion, law,
politics, deterrence, incapacitation and future dangerousness, women,
children, the mentally retarded, the innocent, incompetent counsel, deathqualified juries, mitigation, discrimination, habeas corpus, cost of the
death penalty, physician involvement, families of victims and offenders,
life on death row, clemency, and executions. Chapters relevant to this
bibliography have been individually cited.
AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
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Amnesty International, Amnesty International Website Against the Death
Penalty, at http://www.web.amnesty.org/rmp/dplibrary.nsf/index (last visited
Oct. 1, 2000).
This site contains extensive substantive information concerning the death
penalty. Amnesty International reports on the death penalty are available
in their Web site library going back to 1996. These reports cover many
death penalty issues, including those concerning the mentally ill,
mentally retarded, and juveniles.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AI INDEX: AMR 51/57/98, BETRAYING THE

YOUNG: HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST CHILDREN INTHE U.S. JUSTICE

SYSTEM (1998).
This Amnesty International report discusses human rights violations
concerning juveniles. Part V specifically discusses juveniles and the
death penalty. It asserts that the execution of juveniles violates their
human rights. The report argues the United States is violating the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention
on the Rights of the Child. It also discusses the Supreme Court decision
of Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). The report condemns
the use of the death penalty and reports that capital juries do not always
consider the defendant's youth and background. The report ends with a
recommendation that the United States withdraw its reservation to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, ratify the
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and ensure states comply with the
international standards concerning the execution of juveniles.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AI INDEX: AM
AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY (1987).

51/01/87, UNITED STATES OF

This book gives an overview of the death penalty in America. It contains
a chapter on juvenile death sentences, that discusses United States
domestic standards, the Roach case, and international practice. It also
contains a chapter on the execution of the mentally ill, covering five
cases. The appendices contain summaries of important United States
Supreme Court rulings and death penalty statistics.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AI INDEX: AMR 51/23/91, UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY AND JUVENILE OFFENDERS (1991).

This anti-death penalty report reviews the history, laws, and practice of
executing juvenile offenders. It summarizes Amnesty International's
findings regarding the cases of twenty-threejuveniles sentenced to death.
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American Society of Criminology, Critical Criminology Division, Death
Penalty Information & Resources, at http://sun.soci.niu.edu/-critcrim/dp/
dp.html (last visited on Oct. 1, 2000).
This anti-capital punishment site contains links to Department of Justice
Capital Punishment Statistics, and a page of links on information about
juveniles and the death penalty. These links contain information on
juveniles executed, juveniles on death row, and treaties against executing
juveniles.
James C. Anders, Punishthe Guilty, 72 A.B.A. J., June 1, 1986, at 32.
In this article the author argues age should be a factor in sentencing, not
an absolute bar to capital punishment for juveniles.
Linda Andre-Wells, Comment, Imposing the Death Penalty Upon Juvenile
Offenders: A Current Application of the Eighth Amendment's Prohibition
Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment,21 N.M. L. REV. 373 (1991).
After a discussion of the history of the juvenile death penalty and an
examination of current death penalty statutes, the author looks at
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and Stanfordv. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361 (1989). She concludes the divisive nature of the decisions
leaves the question of juvenile executions open and speculates it might
best be answered by sentencing juries and judges in light of individual
case circumstances rather than having the politically motivated
legislators and judiciary set an arbitrary age.
Gregory Bassham, Note, Rethinking the Emerging Jurisprudenceof Juvenile
Death, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 467 (1991).
This note discusses the recent abandonment of the traditional
proportionality analysis by Supreme Court conservatives. After a
background on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the author looks at the
dissent in Thompson v. Oklahoma,487 U.S. 815 (1988), and the plurality
in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 392 (1989). He argues Justice Scalia's Eighth Amendment
interpretation departs from controlling precedent. He addresses Scalia's
arguments for abandoning the proportionality analysis and refutes the
textualist argument and the majoritarian argument. He defends the
traditional Eighth Amendment analysis and then applies the analysis to
the juvenile death penalty. He argues the juvenile death penalty is
arbitrary and capricious, and that juveniles possess less culpability than
adult offenders. He concludes the execution of juveniles fifteen or
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younger violates the Eighth Amendment, and that the emerging Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence should be rejected.
Terrie A. Bechdel, Life or Death? An Objective Analysis of Capital

PunishmentForJuveniles (1986) (unpublished M.S. thesis, California State
University) (on file with the California State University Library).
This thesis analyzes literature, statutes, Supreme Court decisions, and
statistics pertaining to the juvenile death penalty. The author looks at the
issue of the juvenile death penalty from both the retentionist and
abolitionist perspectives. The author suggests further research is needed
to explore attitudes toward juveniles who commit murder, and to identify
and prevent the problem of juvenile violence.
Philip C. Berg, Recent Developments, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415
(1990).
This article reviews Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The author asserts that
critics of the decisions have an incomplete understanding of the Supreme
Court's holdings. He asserts the debate in Penry and Stanford is not
focused on the culpability ofjuvenile and mentally retarded offenders but
is on federalism and the role of the Court. He argues a case-by-case
analysis is appropriate and that principles of federalism dictate this
analysis is a state role. He concludes this federalism is more appropriate
than a bright line federal rule prohibiting executions of juveniles and the
mentally retarded.

Glenn M. Bieler, Note, Death Be Not Proud: A Note on Juvenile Capital

Punishment, 7 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 179 (1990).
This note looks at Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and concludes the juvenile
death penalty is cruel and unusual punishment. He examines the juvenile
offender's reduced culpability, looking at the state's duty as parens
patriae, waiver into adult court, and "time of life" aspects of
adolescence. He analyzes the Court's definition of Eighth Amendment
consensus and concludes the fate of the juvenile death penalty depends
on the Justices' definitions of consensus.
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Lee A. Bjomdal, Note, The Constitutionalityof the Death Penaltyfor Sixteen
andSeventeen Year Old Offenders: Stanford v. Kentucky, 11 HAMLINEJ. PUB.
L. & POL'Y 175 (1990).
This case note analyzes Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The
author argues the plurality failed to properly examine whether a national
consensus on capital punishment exists and failed to conduct a
proportionality analysis as required by precedent. The author concludes
the plurality destroyed any opportunity for future Eighth Amendment
challenges to the death penalty.
WILLIAM J. BOWERS ET AL., LEGAL HOMICIDE: DEATH AS PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA, 1864-1982 (1984).

This book presents a historical examination of the death penalty. It also
contains studies of post-Furmanv. Georgia,408 U.S. 238 (1972), cases.
The book argues the death penalty is still racially discriminatory, does
not deter, and is arbitrary in its application. The appendix lists stateimposed executions and the offender's age at execution.

Richard J. Brody, Don't Kill Children, 72 A.B.A. J., June 1, 1986, at 32.
In this opposing view to James C. Ander's article Punish the Guilty, the
author argues juveniles should not be executed. He asserts their moral,
emotional, and intellectual development differs from adults; juveniles are
not deterred by the death penalty; juveniles are more likely than adults
to be rehabilitated; and the death penalty is imposed disproportionately
on African-American juveniles.
Bruce L. Brown, The Juvenile Death Penalty in Washington: A State
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 361 (1992).
In this article, the author argues imposing the death penalty on a juvenile
violates Article 1, Section 14 of the Washington Constitution. After
examining the Supreme Court cases of Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815 (1988), and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), the author
looks at Washington's death penalty statute and analyzes it under the
Washington Constitution. First, the author determines that Washington's
protections against cruel punishment are broader than the Eighth
Amendment. Next, he looks at a four part test the Washington Supreme
Court has set out for analyzing Article 1, Section 14. He concludes that
three of the four factors support the fact that juvenile executions are a
cruel punishment under the Washington Constitution.
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David Bruck, An Attorney DecriesJuvenile Executions, in YOUNG BLOOD 159
(Shirley Dicks ed., 1995).
This chapter discusses the case of the youngest person to be executed
during this century. It details the lack of a psychiatric evaluation of the
defendant, the prejudicial venue, and the fact that the defendant's family
had no resources or understanding of the legal system. The author uses
this case to illustrate the problems with the juvenile death penalty.
Richard Burr and Mandy Welch, Killing Kids Who Kill: Desecrating the
Sanctuary of Childhood,29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 929 (1998).
This article is taken from a death penalty symposium reflecting on the
death penalty twenty-five years after Furmanv. Georgia,408 U.S. 238
(1972). The authors point out the international and human rights
communities condemn the juvenile death penalty. They note that
problems such as mental illness, histories of child abuse, and race
discrimination, seen in the adult death penalty, are also found with the
juvenile condemned. They discuss Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815 (1988), and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). They argue
juries do not give full consideration to youth as a mitigating factor but
rather often view youth as an aggravating factor concerning future
dangerousness. They see the juvenile death penalty as evidence that the
United States is abdicating its responsibility toward children. They urge
a call against juvenile executions.
A CAPITAL PUNISHMENT ANTHOLOGY (Victor Streib ed., 1993).
This is an anthology of law review articles dealing with the death
penalty. The majority of articles in the anthology oppose capital
punishment. The anthology includes two articles that deal specifically
with the issue of juvenile executions, one for and one against. Those
articles are included separately in this bibliography.

(Carol D. Foster et al. eds.,
Information Plus, 1992).
Part of the Information Series on Current Topics, this book gives an
overview of the capital punishment debate. It includes summaries of
landmark Supreme Court rulings, including those dealing with juveniles,
psychiatric testimony, the insane, and the mentally retarded. It also
reviews death penalty statutes, looking at the minimum age for
execution, and at the treatment of mental retardation. The book also
gives statistical information on executions, including breakdowns by age
and education, and an overview of capital punishment around the world.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRUEL AND UNUSUAL?
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Sherri Ann Carver, Note, Retribution - A JustificationFor the Execution of
Mentally Retarded and Juvenile Murderers, 16 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 155
(1991).
The author of this note looks at Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989),
and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and concludes these
cases were correctly decided in light of Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence
and the retributive theory of jurisprudence. After analyzing the cases,
she sets forth the general arguments against the death penalty and rebuts
them. She discusses the deterrence and retributive punishment theories
and applies these theories to the circumstances in Penry and Stanford.
She asserts both defendants were capable of distinguishing right from
wrong and evaluating various courses of action because they both killed
to escape detection. She argues in both cases the sentencer is always free
to reject the death penalty if the juvenile or mentally retarded offender
is not sufficiently culpable.
J. David Clark, Jr., Note, Juveniles and the Death Penalty - A Square Peg in
a Round Hole, 10 Miss. C. L. REV. 169 (1990).
After a background of the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment
interpretations, the author analyzes Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
815 (1988). He concludes the Court correctly interpreted the cruel and
unusual punishments clause as it pertains to juvenile executions. He
argues the plurality is not limited to finding a national consensus but
acted properly in drawing the line. He asserts there exists a trend toward
consensus in prohibiting juveniles younger than sixteen from being
executed. He also argues children differ from adults and are less
culpable. He asserts that this lesser culpability makes retribution an
improper justification for executing minors. He states executing minors
has no deterrent effect on adult offenders or other minors so that
justification also does not support executing juveniles.
Laura Dalton, Note, Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v. Missouri: A
Violation of an Emerging Rule of Customary InternationalLaw, 32 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 161 (1990).
This note looks at Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and
concludes the Court erred in rejecting the relevance of international law
in an Eighth Amendment analysis. The author examines international
human rights treaties and concludes the United States is free from any
binding international agreements. She also looks at the incorporation of
international law into federal common law. She finds barriers in this
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application, due to the uncertainty that eighteen is the appropriate age to
draw the line and to the isolationism of the United States. She examines
whether the prohibition on juvenile executions has reached the status of
customary international law and concludes it has not. Furthermore, she
finds the United States is a persistent dissenter in the area of juvenile
executions. She does find, however, that the United States courts must
consult, although not necessarily follow, international law when dealing
with domestic cases involving human rights. Thus, she concludes, the
Stanford plurality erred in rejecting the use of these norms.
Connie De La Vega and Jennifer Brown, Can A United States Treaty
Reservation Providea SanctuaryForthe Juvenile DeathPenalty?, 32 U.S.F.
L. REV. 735 (1998).
The authors argue international law and opinion prohibit the execution
of juveniles. They look at the arguments surrounding juvenile
culpability, mitigating factors, racism, ineffective assistance of counsel,
prosecutorial misconduct, and the death row phenomenon. They
examine the Geneva Convention, American Convention of Human
Rights, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and other
international agreements. They see any reservation by the United States
to these agreements as void because such a reservation is incompatible
with the object and purpose of such treaties, violates customary
international law, and would conflict with jus cogens. The authors see
the prohibition on the execution of juveniles as customary international
law due to the wide spread state practice prohibiting it. They see the
treaties discussed as evidence of opinio juris. They argue the United
States is not a persistent objector since there was a defacto ban on
juvenile executions while these agreements were being made. The
authors also assert the almost worldwide prohibition of thejuvenile death
penalty rises to the level ofjus cogens. The authors conclude with the
hope that international scrutiny and condemnation will shame the United
States into finally abolishing the juvenile death penalty.
Connie De La Vega and Jennifer Fiore, The Supreme Court of the United
States Has Been Called Upon to Determine the Legality of the Death Penalty
in Michael Domingues v. Nevada, 21 WHTrMR L. REv. 215 (1999).
This article summarizes arguments made in an Amicus Curiae brief on
behalf of Michael Domingues. The authors discuss the juvenile death
penalty in light of international law and argue United States courts are
prohibited from executing juveniles due to international law and
international agreements of the United States.
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Death Penalty Focus, at http://208.55.30.156/about/about_main.shtml (last
visited Oct. 1, 2000).
This Web site is by an anti-death penalty organization. They publish
educational materials and fact sheets on their Web site. The site has an
article on human rights and the execution of juveniles.
THE DEATH PENALTY INAMERICA (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., rev. ed. 1967).
This anthology on capital punishment, edited by noted abolitionist Hugo
Bedau, collects works presenting information about the history and
implementation of the death penalty, arguments for and against the death
penalty, social science research on death penalty issues, and case
histories. This particular edition contains a section on juveniles and the
death penalty that is omitted in later editions.
THE DEATH PENALTY INAMERICA (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3d ed., 1982).
This later edition of Hugo Bedau's anthology on capital punishment
includes chapters on deterrence, public attitudes towards the death
penalty, error, constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment, and
arguments for and against the death penalty. In the beginning chapters,
Bedau discusses statutory mitigating circumstances such as diminished
capacity, mental disturbance, and the age of the offender.
Death Penalty Information Center at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ (last
visited Oct. 1, 2000).
This anti-death penalty site contains extensive information on the death
penalty. It addresses special topics, among which are juveniles and the
mentally retarded. The pages include statistics on juveniles on death row
and juveniles executed. It also looks at recent developments and
minimum execution ages by jurisdictions.
Death Penalty.Net at http://www.deathpenalty.net/ (last updated June 4,
1999).
This is an anti-death penalty Web site maintained by an intern of the
ACLU Capital Punishment Project. The site contains facts and figures
on the juvenile death penalty. The site also links to other Web sites with
information on juveniles sentenced to death.
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Death Penalty USA Pages at http://www.agitator.condp/ (last visited Oct. 1,
2000).
This Web site is an anti-death penalty site maintained by an Amnesty
International member. It contains lists of juveniles on death row and
juveniles executed. It breaks these lists down by year and by state.
Karen Rasmusson Di Donna, Note, Stanford v. Kentucky and Wilkins v.
Missouri: Juveniles, CapitalCrime and the Death Penalty, 11 CRIM. JUST. J.
469 (1989).
The article examines Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and
explores whether there is a national consensus against the juvenile death
penalty. The author asserts the plurality erred in its analysis because it
ignored the states that prohibited capital punishment, disregarded public
opinion polls, and failed to recognize that retribution and deterrence are
not furthered by the execution of juveniles.
Shirley Dicks, Gary Graham:Juvenile On DeathRow, in YOUNG BLOOD 181
(Shirley Dicks ed., 1995).
This chapter discusses the case of Gary Graham, a seventeen year old
African-American who was convicted on the basis of questionable
identification by a single witness. Several crime scene witnesses were
never called upon to testify. No one interviewed alibi witnesses. No
information was given concerning childhood abuse. The chapter uses the
case to highlight problems with the juvenile death penalty and the Texas
clemency review process.
Shirley Dicks, Juveniles On DeathRow: Case Profiles, in YOUNG BLOOD 117
(Shirley Dicks ed., 1995).
This chapter discusses eight cases of juvenile offenders sentenced to
death. The cases note evidence of child abuse, drug or alcohol abuse,
mental illness, and poor representation by the offender's attorney.
Richard C. Dieter, InternationalPerspectivesOn the DeathPenalty:A Costly

Isolation for the U.S., at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/intemational
report.html.
This report discusses the international trend toward the abolition of the
death penalty and the United States' position as a violator of human
rights. Among the issues discussed are juvenile executions. The report
discusses several human rights treaties that the United States has signed
but not ratified. It also discusses the costs of the United States' failure
to abide by international law regarding capital cases.
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Clifford K. Dome and Kenneth E. Gewerth, Imposing the Death Penalty on
Juvenile Murderers: A ConstitutionalAssessment, 75 JUDICATURE 6 (1991).
This piece gives a review of the standards and methods used to determine
if a punishment is cruel and unusual and discusses judicial application of
these standards to juvenile executions. The authors conclude the
Supreme Court has no clear method for determining if a national
consensus on the juvenile death penalty exists and that there is a
fundamental disagreement about how the constitutionality of any
punishment is to be judged.
W. James Ellison, State Execution of Juveniles: Defining "Youth" as a
Mitigating Factorfor Imposing a Sentence of Less Than Death, 11 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 1 (1987).
The author asserts the Supreme Court failed to define or provide
substantive guidelines for establishing the moral culpability of juvenile
murderers in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). This leaves the
sentencer with unguided discretion to interpret and define youth as a
mitigating factor. He concludes future death penalty statutes must
specifically define and address youth as a mitigating factor.
Scott Allan Erickson, Note, The United States Becomes a Member of an
InternationalMajorityBanningthe Executionof ChildOffenders, 13 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L.J. 784 (1990).
After a brief historical look at the death penalty and its application to
minors, the author examines the international prohibition on juvenile
executions. He concludes that even before Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487
U.S. 815 (1988), the United States was bound by this international
prohibition. He comments on the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949,
Article Six of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and the American Convention on Civil and Human Rights. He concludes
by applauding the Court's decision in Thompson v. Oklahoma, which
placed the United States in line with international law prohibiting
juvenile executions.
Licia A. Esposito, Note, The Constitutionality of Executing Juvenile and
Mentally Retarded Offenders: A Precedential Analysis and Proposal for
Reconsideration,31 B.C. L. REV. 901 (1990).
The author examines the evolution of the Supreme Court's definition of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and looks at Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
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(1989), and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989). She concludes none
of the Court's approaches adequately addresses the problems ofjuveniles
and the mentally retarded. She argues the Court should adopt a
compelling state interest/least restrictive means approach to determine
the constitutionality of juvenile and mentally retarded offender's death
sentences.
Alison R. Faltersack, Note, Stanford v. Kentucky: The Minimum Age for the
Maximum Penalty - Death, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 453 (1990).
This note analyzes Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and
concludes the Court correctly held that imposing the death penalty on
sixteen-and-seventeen-year-olds is not unconstitutional. The author finds
the Court is correct because deference to legislative judgment is a
necessity, and an examination of death penalty statutes reveals no
national consensus against executing juveniles. The author finds the
Court appropriately rejected other age-statutes and views of special
interest groups and foreign countries. She asserts the Court correctly
found juvenile executions can serve the penological goal of deterrence
and retribution. The author finds two flaws in the Court's decision: that
the Court ruled on a statistical fallacy when looking at jury decisions,
and that it failed to conduct a proportionality analysis.
Mike Farrell, On the Juvenile Death Penalty, 21 WHrrIER L. REV. 207
(1999).
The author discusses the juvenile death penalty, looking to international
law and the examples of other countries in an attempt to urge the
prohibition of juvenile executions.
Katherine Hunt Federle, EmancipationandExecution: TransferringChildren
to CriminalCourt in Capital Cases, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 447.
The author discusses the role of juvenile waiver into adult court in
juvenile death penalty cases. She argues the Court erred in Thompson v.
Oklahoma,487 U.S. 815 (1988), and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989), when it failed to analyze the underlying waiver decisions. She
looks at Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), the Supreme Court
case addressing the constitutionality of juvenile waiver. She then
examines the use of Kent criteria in the waivers of Thompson, Stanford,
and Wilkins. She finds that in Thompson and Stanford, at least four
justices viewed waiver provisions as evidence of legislative intent to
execute minors. She notes courts weigh certain factors more heavily than
others when waiving juveniles. She argues transfer to adult court does
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not ensure only the most culpable minors are tried as adults. She asserts
the decision to transfer may be based on bureaucratic reasons rather than
an individualistic determination of blameworthiness. She also argues
that unquestioned acceptance of transfer authority masks discrimination
against minority juveniles, since they are more likely to be transferred
than white juveniles. She suggests that if waiver is to continue, courts
should have a presumption that a minor is not mature enough to be
criminally culpable for the death penalty.
Norman J. Finkel et al., Killing Kids: The Juvenile Death Penalty and
Community Sentiment, 12 BEHAV. Scl. & L. 5 (1994).
The authors present the results of two controlled experiments with deathqualified subjects. In the first experiment, they found significant case
variables: as the heinousness of the crime increased, the age effect
became less significant. The second experiment used the most heinous
case from the first experiment and varied the type of defendant. The ages
of the defendant ranged from thirteen to twenty-five. The results showed
two discriminable breaks between the younger group and the combined
middle and older group.
Norman J. Finkel, Socio-ScientificEvidence andSupreme CourtNumerology:
When JusticesAttempt Social Science, 11 BEHAv. So. & L. 67 (1993).
This article examines the Supreme Court's analysis of objective indicia
in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The author reviews both
the plurality and the dissent's social science analysis of legislative
enactments. He finds fatal flaws in both. He asserts the appropriate
denominator is fifty-two, the number of states and jurisdictions. He
asserts juveniles are the group in question and adults are the control
group. He defines the question as whether legislative treatment of
juveniles and adults show significant differences. His results indicate a
significant difference that deepens the younger the offender. The author
rejects jury decision data because of the missing denominators such as
the number of cases brought to trial or the number of cases with
convictions. He looks at Justice Scalia's framing of the question, and
concludes it contradicts precedent and presents an impossible burden.
James P. Fisher, Comment, Capital Punishment For Juveniles - A
ConstitutionalMinimum Set By Elastic Principles, 16 CAP. U. L. REv. 655
(1987).
After exploring the background of the Eighth Amendment, the author
distills three elastic principles that define cruel and unusual: standards of
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decency, dignity of man, and sentence by individualized consideration.
He applies the issue of the juvenile death penalty to these principles. He
argues contemporary indicators show that reasonable minds differ as to
whether juvenile executions should be prohibited. He concludes this
demonstrates a legal and social environment where a bright line age limit
is premature.
Joan Fitzpatrick, The Significance and Determination of Customary
InternationalHuman Rights Law: The Relevance of Customary International
Norms to the Death Penalty in the United States, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
165 (1995/1996).
The author examines international law and capital punishment. She
notes United States' courts have largely ignored international law
arguments. She hypothesizes three possible reasons: theories of
customary law and the death penalty are flawed; advocacy of these
theories is flawed; or capital punishment is so political that courts have
ignored international law. The author then looks at some of the
difficulties in determining whether customary law prohibits juvenile
executions. She asserts that without proof that the prohibition on
juvenile executions in the international scene is legally binding on the
United States, there is no reason for United States' courts to use
international law in Eighth Amendment interpretation. She argues,
however, that there are good reasons to interpret unclear constitutional
provisions, such as the Eighth Amendment, so as to be consistent with
international law. She concludes that even assuming a strong theory of
international customary law and intense advocacy, the death penalty is
too political and the courts will be too reluctant to look at the issue
through international law.
Linda A. Foley, FloridaAfter the FurmanDecision: The Effect of Extralegal
Factorson the Processingof Capital Offense Cases, 5 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 457
(1987).
This study looks at defendants indicted for first degree murder in Florida
between 1972 and 1978. The data gathered included demographic
information consisting of age, race, sex, education, and prior convictions.
The author found age and the number of additional offenses to be two
predictors that influenced trial outcomes at a statistically significant
level. She found younger people were more likely to be adjudicated
guilty than older people. She theorizes that younger defendants might
appear more threatening to middle-aged or older jurors. The study also
found the sex of the offender and the race of the victim influenced the
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conviction and imposition of the death penalty. She concludes Florida's
post-Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), statute has failed to
eliminate discrimination in the death penalty's imposition.
Donald T. Fox, Current Developments, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 601 (1988).
This article reports on the decision of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights' finding that the United States had violated two provisions
of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. The case
involved two persons sentenced to death for crimes committed before
they were eighteen. The Commission held that the rule prohibiting
juvenile executions was jus cogens, and thus no derogation was
permitted. The author asserts the Commission did not elaborate
sufficiently on this holding. He argues that although the United States
is not bound by the decision, it should be persuasive in an Eighth
Amendment analysis of the evolving standards of decency. He raises the
issue of foreign intervention in United States domestic policy, but notes
the United States may have acquired limitations on human rights issues
due to its membership in the OAS (Organization of American States).
John R. Frank, Note, Stanford v. Kentucky: Did the Court Bite the
ConstitutionalBullet?, 23 AKRON L. REV. 547 (1990).
After a short historical review of juvenile capital punishment, the author
analyzes Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). He finds the
plurality's analysis of legislative and jury/prosecutor statistics is
appropriate, however, he asserts the plurality erred when it failed to
conduct a proportionality analysis. He argues this failure was harmless,
due to the heinous nature of the crimes and the closeness of the
defendants to their majority age. He criticizes Justice O'Connor's
opinion for her requirement that state legislatures include a minimum age
in their death penalty statutes. He also criticizes the dissent for its
expansion of the national consensus analysis beyond the plurality's
criteria, and for its decision that the punishment was excessive.
Michael E. Garner, CapitalPunishmentFor Minors, 15 J. Juv. L. 150 (1994).
This article analyzes Stanford v. Kentucky 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The
author asserts the constitutionality of the death penalty for minors is
dubious. He views Stanford as unreliable due to the split in reasoning
and the departure of Justice White from the Court. He sees Thompson
v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), as even more precarious due to the
current make up of the Court.
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Elisabeth Gasparini, Note, Juvenile Capital Punishment: A Spectacle of a
Child's Injustice, 49 S.C. L. REv. 1073 (1998).
This note discusses a South Carolina juvenile death penalty case. The
author argues that the constantly shifting legislation regarding the
juvenile death penalty should not be the sole indicator of the evolving
standards of decency. She asserts the national consensus standards of
decency then becomes a majoritarian rule and a battle of statistical
interpretation. The author criticizes Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989), for ignoring international opinion. She argues international
norms prohibit the execution of juveniles. She also criticizes the
Stanford plurality for rejecting the proportionality test. She argues
retribution and deterrence are not served by executing juveniles. She
finds that the role of executioner conflicts with the state's role ofparens
patriae.
Steven N. Gersten, The Constitutionalityof Executing Juvenile Offenders:
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 24 CRIM. L. BULL. 91 (1988).
The author considers the juvenile death penalty and concludes the
execution ofjuveniles should be prohibited. He first looks at the history
of juvenile executions and the juvenile justice system. He examines the
process of waiver into adult court and finds it flawed. He argues the
legislative trend prohibiting execution of juveniles, the reluctance of
juries to sentence juveniles to death, and public opinion polls show the
contemporary standards of society do not support the juvenile death
penalty. He finds further support for this when he looks at international
law, the Pope's declaration, the Model Penal Code, and the American
Bar Association's position. He additionally finds the penological goals
of retribution and deterrence are not supported by juvenile executions.
He argues children deserve special treatment, analogizes juveniles to the
insane, and asserts today's children are less mature than children at the
turn of the century.
Arthur J. Goldberg, A Kinder and Gentler Supreme Court, 17 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q.

287 (1990).

The author discusses Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and asserts both cases were
wrongly decided by the Supreme Court. He argues the plurality
erroneously relied on the fact that a majority of states permitting capital
punishment do not expressly exempt juveniles or the mentally retarded,
and that the plurality failed to take into account the world community's
stance on these issues.

NORTHERN ILWNOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

Helene B. Greenwald, Comment, CapitalPunishmentfor Minors:An Eighth
Amendment Analysis, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1471 (1983).
In this comment, the author discusses the historical treatment of minors
at common law, the development of the juvenile justice system, and the
present trend of transferring juveniles to criminal court. The author
argues sentencing minors to death violates the excessiveness strand of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. She asserts the death penalty
is always disproportionate when applied to minors, and that it fails to
make a contribution to the acceptable goals of punishment.
Helene B. Greenwald, Eighth Amendment - Minors and the Death Penalty:
Decisionand Avoidance, 73 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 1525 (1982).
This note discusses Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and
chastises the Court for its improper use of judicial restraint. The author
asserts Eddings adds nothing to death penalty jurisprudence, but merely
applies established rules and guidelines. She argues an analysis of
Eddingsreveals the Court's abandonment of well-established procedures
for certiorari in order to avoid the issue of juveniles and the death
penalty.
John J. Gruttadaurio, Note, Consistency in the Application of the Death
Penalty to Juveniles and the Mentally Impaired: A Suggested Legislative
Approach, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 211 (1989).
The author argues that the same considerations protecting juveniles from

execution should apply to those who are functionally juveniles because
of their mental impairment. He proposes a model statute, concluding
there is a need for state statutes to take the issue of mental impairment
out of aggravating-mitigating circumstances balancing and removing the
entire class of mentally impaired from execution.

Robert Y. Gwin, The Death Penalty: Cruel and Unusual Punishment When
Imposed Upon Juveniles, KY. BENCH & B., April, 1981, at 16.
The article looks at the two prongs of the cruel and unusual punishments
test and concludes the juvenile death penalty violates the Eighth
Amendment because it is unacceptable to contemporary society and it is
excessive.

HERBERT H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1996).
This book discusses the anti-death penalty movement in America from
1972 to 1994. The author examines the efforts to develop a multi
organizational network to attack the death penalty. He discusses the
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involvement and contributions of Amnesty, International. Amnesty
International pushed for incremental attacks on the death penalty and
pursued studies revealing the lack of public support for executions of
those under eighteen, those with a history of mental illness, and the
mentally retarded. The book reports the success of legislation
prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded.
L. HALE, A REVIEW OF JUVENILE EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA
(Criminology Studies vol. 3, 1997).
This study lists 330 juveniles executed in the United States. The study
takes a functional and conflict approach and looks at how various
characteristics of juveniles have contributed to the administration of the
death penalty for this class. It also examines five different periods of
American history where juveniles were death eligible. The author
performs a historical analysis, looking at the social attitudes of the period
regarding age, race, and gender of the defendant.
ROBERT

Cele Hancock, Note, The Incompatibility of the Juvenile Death Penalty and
the United Nation's Convention on the Rights of the Child: Domestic and
InternationalConcerns, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 699 (1995).
This note looks at the Supreme Court decisions discussing the juvenile
death penalty. The author concludes the Court's unwillingness to find
a national consensus against the juvenile death penalty creates a need for
the individual states to determine their own sentences. She argues the
United States must preserve individual state sovereignty and reserve
disagreement to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child. She urges the Court to give the states clear guidelines concerning
the juvenile death penalty in order to contain the international
community's attempts to dictate United State's laws.
Joan F. Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic Effects of
InternationalNorms Restrictingthe Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U.
CIN. L. REv. 655 (1983).
This is an article looking at international norms on the execution of
juveniles and their effect on the imposition of the juvenile death penalty
in the United States. The author examines the theory that international
human rights norms are a part of the federal common law. He also looks
at the position of the United States as a dissenter to the norm.
Additionally, he examines the theory of international norms on juvenile
executions as incorporated into the Eighth Amendment analysis. He
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predicts that using these theories to invalidate state statutes authorizing
juvenile executions will encounter stiff resistance.
Lisa Joy Harwood, Comment, Devolving Standards of Decency: The Death
Penaltyfor Juveniles, 2 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 87 (1990).

The author examines Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and
criticizes the decision for its departure from earlier death penalty cases
and international norms concerning human rights. She argues the issue
of executing juveniles should be looked at in the framework of the world
community. She points to the international community's prohibition on
the execution ofjuveniles and its movement toward total abolition of the
death penalty. She looks at the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, American Convention on Human Rights, and the
Geneva Convention. She compares the United States' policy on juvenile
executions with the Soviet Union's, and finds the Soviet restrictions to
be more enlightened than the current policies of the United States.

David Heffernan, Comment, America the Cruel and Unusual? An Analysis
of the Eighth Amendment Under InternationalLaw, 45 CATH.U. L. REV. 481

(1996).

This comment looks at how international law and the Eighth
Amendment interrelate. The author looks at Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence in general and then specifically at death penalty cases. He
compares these interpretations to the international standard, and finds
there is a broader scope of protection under the international standard.
He examines thejuvenile death penalty, and concludes the United States'
reservation to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
conflicts with the non-derogability clause. Thus, he finds it violates an
international norm. He concludes that the Supreme Court's narrowing
of the Eighth Amendment means there is now little symmetry between
the Eighth Amendment and the international standard.

Frank W. Heft Jr., Death Penalty for Teens: Is It Cruel and Unusual
Punishment? Yes, 75 A.B.A. J., June 1989, at 42.

This is an excerpt from Heft's brief on behalf of Kevin Stanford in
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). He argues the death penalty
for juveniles is unconstitutional.
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Laura Ann Herbert, The Court, Legislators, and Juvenile Capital Punishment
(1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Mississippi) (on file
with the University of Mississippi Library).
This dissertation looks at Thompson v. Oklahoma,487 U.S. 815 (1988);
Stanfordv. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); and at the perspectives often
state legislatures. Based on survey responses, the author constructs three
models. Model One looks at which variables predict legislator's attitudes
toward juvenile capital punishment. Model Two looks at which variables
predict legislator's attitudes toward Supreme Court decisions. Model
Three looks at variables to determine which legislators are more likely
to know their state laws. In Model One, the state, gender, political
ideology, and attitude toward adult capital punishment were significant
variables. In Model Two, race was a significant variable. In Model
Three, a majority of legislators were not aware of their own state laws.
Significant variables for Model Three included state, criminal justice
experience, and general attitude toward capital punishment.
Christopher M. Hill, Can the Death Penalty Be Imposed on Juveniles: The
UnansweredQuestion in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 20 CRIM. L. BULL. 5 (1984).
This article discusses the juvenile death penalty in light of Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and other Eighth Amendment cases.
The author examines public, legislative, judicial, and international
attitudes toward juvenile executions. He concludes these attitudes do not
rise to the level of widespread rejection. He discusses death penalty
jurisprudence and the Eighth Amendment tests, and then analyzes the
treatment of the juvenile offender in general. He asserts the judicial
waiver system is unreliable and should not be considered proof that a
juvenile should be treated as an adult for sentencing purposes. He
concludes the time is not ripe for ajudicial ruling prohibiting the juvenile
death penalty.
Shannon Hill, UnitedStates:A World Leaderin Executing Juveniles, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH CHILDREN'S RIGHTS PROmECT,

Mar. 1995, at 1.

Human Rights Watch is an organization which opposes the death penalty
on all grounds. This report condemns the juvenile death penalty. The
report examines Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and the current status
of death penalty statutes. The report asserts the United States is bound
as a signatory not to act in a manner defeating the purpose of the
American Convention on Human Rights, Convention on the Rights of the
Child, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and
thus should not execute juveniles. The report also concludes the United
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States violates customary international law when it executes juveniles.
The report examines the characteristics of juveniles sentenced to death
and finds many of them suffer from inadequate legal representation and
come from abusive backgrounds. The report looks at eight individual
cases. It summarizes professional and legal views on the juvenile death
penalty.
Joseph L. Hoffmann, On the Perilsof Line-Drawing:Juveniles and the Death
Penalty, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 229 (1989).
This article focuses exclusively on the juvenile death penalty and the
principles of retributive justice. The author argues modem retributive
theory demands both cardinal and ordinal proportionality, and compels
the Supreme Court to reject a bright line ban on the juvenile death
penalty.
Maria M. Homan, Note, The Juvenile Death Penalty: Counsel's Role in the
Development of a MitigationDefense, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 767 (1987).
The author discusses research on juvenile homicides and why juveniles
kill. She identifies these juveniles as having suffered from intense
emotional and physical abuse, neurological impairment, and drug abuse.
She argues these studies on juvenile murderers can assist defense counsel
in understanding juvenile clients and developing mitigation arguments.
She asserts these studies demonstrate the death penalty is
disproportionate punishment. She urges defense counsel in juvenile
death penalty cases to investigate family history, neurological
impairment, and drug abuse. She uses the case of James Terry Roach to
illustrate the failure of defense counsel to present mitigating evidence.
ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTnVE (1989).
This report to the United Nations Committee on Crime Prevention and
Control is based on a study of the death penalty. The report addresses
the observation of standards and safeguards guaranteeing the rights of
those facing the death penalty. The report finds twenty-six states had
minimum death penalty ages from twelve to seventeen or no minimum
age at all, thus violating standards for juveniles. The report examines
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and Stanfordv. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361 (1989). In addition to juvenile safeguards, the report
addresses the mentally incapacitated. It finds the federal government and
some states have modified the insanity defense, although three states
abolished it. Twelve states have adopted a guilty but mentally ill verdict,
which the author believes precludes a death sentence. The report notes
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the problem of death row inmates becoming mentally ill after trial and
the execution of mentally retarded offenders in the United States.
Cathleen E. Hull, Comment, "Enlightened By a Humane Justice": An
InternationalLaw Argument Against the Juvenile Death Penalty,47 U. KAN.
L. REv. 1079 (1999).
After a review of Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), this article discusses the
international law argument against the juvenile death penalty. First, the
author looks at treaty law, specifically the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, American Convention on Human Rights,
Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Fourth Geneva
Convention. She concludes the United States is in violation of these
treaties and that any reservations are invalid because they are
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaties. She also argues
the United States has violated the customary rule of international law
prohibiting juvenile executions. She asserts the widespread prohibition
has evolved into an extensive and almost uniform practice, thus
satisfying the elements of generality, consistency, and duration. She
finds opinio juris satisfied because very few states execute juveniles.
Lastly, she examines whether the prohibition has becomejus cogens and
concludes it has not.
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH
PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES: REPORT OF A MISSION (1996).

This is the report of a fact finding mission of the International
Commission of Jurists. The primary purj~ose of the mission was to look
at practices and procedures in capital sentencing and examine whether
these conformed to the international obligations of the United States.
The report discusses several landmark decisions of the Supreme Court,
sets out two official studies on racial disparity in capital sentencing,
analyzes the United States ratification of several treaties, traces the
historical background of the death penalty in the United States, and looks
at statistical information. The appendices contain statistics and the text
of the relevant international instruments. The Commission finds that
capital sentencing as currently applied is inconsistent with the
international obligations undertaken by the United States. Among other
things, the report discusses the issue of the juvenile death penalty.
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Nancy A. Inskeep, Note, Death'sForeclosure:CapitalPunishmentofSixteenand-Seventeen-Year Olds UnderStanford v. Kentucky, 18 N. KY. L. REV. 81
(1990).
This article looks at Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and
concludes contemporary standards permit the death penalty for
aggravated murder, regardless of whether the offender is ajuvenile. The
author argues chronological age cannot excuse the defendants in Stanford
v. Kentucky.
Lara Intrator, Note, Thompson v. Oklahoma: The Role of InternationalLaw
in Juvenile Death Penalty Litigation,8 WIS. INT'L L. J. 165 (1989).
After an overview of the history of the juvenile death penalty and the role
of international norms in death penalty cases, the author looks at
Thompson v. Oklahoma,487 U.S. 815 (1988). She discusses the way the
plurality, dissent, and concurrence, treat the idea of international law in
domestic litigation. She finds that although the plurality and the dissent
did not accept that international law was binding on the United States,
the fact that international norms were discussed marks an awareness and
possible willingness to accept the validity of international norms in
human rights issues such as the juvenile death penalty.
Nick Jackson, Note, Thompson v. Oklahoma: The Law ofAverages, 4 DET. C.
L. REV. 999 (1988).
This note analyzes Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). The
author asserts that the forty year base the Supreme Court chose to
examine for capital punishment statistics was not a long enough span of
history to discover public attitudes toward capital punishment. He also
argues that by picking and choosing its statistics, the Court can force a
definition of cruel and unusual punishment that bears no relationship to
a national consensus on the death penalty. He states the Thompson Court
redrafted what the original framers had in mind. He foresees that as the
Court's membership changes, the states may be given greater latitude in
delivering death sentences.
Sherri Jackson, Too Young to Die - Juveniles and the Death Penalty- A Better
Alternative to Killing OurChildren: Youth Empowerment, 22 NEwENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 391 (1996).
This note argues the juvenile death penalty is cruel and unusual
punishment and that there are better alternatives to dealing with violent
juvenile offenders than execution. The author first explores the juvenile
justice system and the history of the juvenile death penalty. She then

2001]

WALKING THE EDGE OF DEATH

performs an Eighth Amendment analysis. She finds capital punishment
of juveniles was not considered cruel and unusual by the framers. She
does find juvenile executions unacceptable to today's society, and comes
to this conclusion after looking at: other legislative restrictions on
juveniles, the rarity of death sentences, opinion polls, opinions of
professional organizations, and views of the international community.
She finds the punishment disproportionate to the crime because juveniles
lack the culpability and maturity of adult offenders. She suggests
alternatives to execution such as long term incarceration and creative
rehabilitation programs. She proposes that the long term solution is to
promote programs of youth empowerment.
MARGARET C. JASPER, THE LAW OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1998).

This book on capital punishment contains chapters on legal
representation, public opinion, costs, deterrence, erroneous convictions,
discrimination, women,juveniles, sentence review, international opinion,
the federal death penalty, and the history of the death penalty. The
chapter on juveniles gives statistical information on current juveniles
under a death sentence. It also briefly discusses the international status
of the juvenile death penalty.

Rona L. Just, Note, Executing Youthful Offenders: The UnansweredQuestion
in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 13 FORDHAM URn. L.J. 471 (1985).
The author looks at the juvenile death penalty and concludes it should be
prohibited. She first looks at the theories of punishment. She finds the
juvenile status of the offender makes punishment based on these theories
ineffective. She then looks at the development of the juvenile court
system and the special status afforded juveniles in our society. She
examines death penalty jurisprudence and the rights of juveniles. After
looking at current death penalty statutes and appellate decisions on the
juvenile death penalty, she recommends a model amendment to death
penalty statutes that prohibits the execution of juveniles.
Lauren B. Kallins, Comment, The JuvenileDeath Penalty:Is the UnitedStates
in Contravention of InternationalLaw?, 17 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 77
(1993).
After a brief history of the death penalty in the United States, the author
examines the juvenile death penalty in light of international treaties and
customary international law. The author argues customary international
law does not obligate the United States to prohibit juvenile executions
because the existence of a state practice proscribing execution of minors
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cannot be established. She also argues that opiniojuris does not apply
because there has been no real evidence offered to demonstrate it exists
as to the prohibition of juvenile executions. She also points out that the
United States' protests against a rule prohibiting the execution of minors
can be seen in the debates surrounding human rights treaties. She
concludes that although the Supreme Court is unwilling to enforce
international standards concerning the execution of juveniles, it is not
blind to their relevance.
Seung Oh Kang, Note, The Efficacy of Youth As a Mitigating Circumstance:
Preservationof the Capital Defendant's ConstitutionalRights Pursuantto
TraditionalEighth Amendment Jurisprudence,28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 747

(1994).
This note looks at the issue of the juvenile death penalty and concludes
that establishing a bright line prohibition on the execution of juveniles
would offend the dignity of man and undermine Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence. The author criticizes the plurality in Stanfordv. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361 (1989), for failing to conduct a proportionality test. He
finds a generalized concept that juveniles are less blameworthy than
adults who commit similar crimes, but argues a bright line exclusion
conflicts with traditional Eighth Amendment values because it fails to
individually examine the proportionality of the death penalty to the
defendant's culpability and the goals of retribution and deterrence. He
argues age should mitigate but not exempt juveniles from the death
penalty.

Jay Lee Kanzler Jr., Note, Wilkins v. Missouri: The Court Searches for a
Consensus to the Cruel and Unusual Question, 35 St. Louis U. L.J. 125
(1990).
After an overview of recent capital punishment decisions pertinent to the
juvenile death penalty, the case note examines Wilkins v. Missouri
(consolidated with Stanford v. Kentucky). The author finds the Supreme
Court split three ways in its interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause. He asserts the plurality erred when it failed to
apply a proportionality analysis and rejected ethicoscientific data. He
argues the dissent erred when it disregarded evidence of legislative
enactments and jury determinations. He concludes Justice O'Connor's
opinion to be the correct approach, looking to the individual jurisdictions
permitting or prohibiting the juvenile death penalty.
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Warren M. Kato, Comment, The Juvenile Death Penalty, 18 J. Juv. L. 112
(1997).
The author begins with a history of the juvenile death penalty. He
analyzes Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and concludes
the Court erred in drawing a bright line rule prohibiting the execution of
juveniles younger than fifteen. He criticizes the plurality's examination
of irrelevant age-based statutes. He asserts the plurality failed to give
proper weight to state certification statutes. He finds the plurality's
analysis of legislative enactments flawed because they exclude those
states which authorized the death penalty but did not list a minimum age.
He concludes the plurality placed too much emphasis on an international
consensus. He examines the plurality's determination that juveniles as
a class are less culpable than adults and finds this conclusion too broad.
He concludes the plurality's analysis of retribution and deterrence was
based on the subjective feelings of the justices not on objective analysis.
He analyzes the current make up of the Court and argues Thompson
would be overruled if another case like it came before the Court.
Robert Anthony Klein, Note, Juvenile Criminals and the Death Penalty:
Resurrectionof the Question Left Unanswered in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 11
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 437 (1985).
In this note, the author looks at Trimble v. Maryland, 478 A.2d 1143
(Md. 1984), a case in which the Supreme Court denied certiorari, and
examines the constitutionality of the juvenile death penalty. He begins
with a discussion of the legislative waiver process in Maryland and the
Federal Youth Corrections Act. Next he addresses the death penalty in
Maryland and its application in Trimble's case. He concludes the
Maryland statute is flawed but constitutional. He further asserts an equal
protection argument based on Trimble's status as a juvenile would be
denied. Finally, he examines the Maryland court's Eighth Amendment
analysis, He concludes the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in
Trimble implies the death penalty for juveniles is not per se
unconstitutional.
B.E.F. Knell, Capital Punishment:Its Administration in Relation to Juvenile
Offenders in the Nineteenth Century and Its Possible Administration in the
Eighteenth Century, 5 BRIT.J. CRIMINOLOGY 198 (1965).
The author examines the common belief that children in the eighteenth
and nineteenth century were frequently executed. He concludes this
belief is erroneous and that juveniles were very rarely executed. For
example, he finds 103 death sentenced juveniles between the years 1801
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and 1836, but notes that none of them were actually executed. He
concludes more empirical research is needed, but argues judicial
execution of children in the eighteenth and nineteenth century was never
common.
T. Shawn Lanier, Note, Juvenile Offenders and the Death Penalty: An
Analysis of Stanford v. Kentucky, 45 MERCER L. REv. 1097 (1994).
After setting forth a brief history of the juvenile death penalty, the author
examines Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). He concludes the
plurality erroneously decided the case and was inconsistent with
Supreme Court precedent. He asserts the plurality's sole reliance on
state death penalty statutes ignores precedent, as does the refusal to
consider international norms,jury sentencing patterns, opinion polls, and
views of professional organizations. He finds the plurality further
abandoned precedent when it failed to perform a proportionality analysis.
BARRY LATZER, DEATH PENALTY CASES: LEADING U.S. SUPREME COURT
CASES ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1998).

This book contains excerpts of the Supreme Court opinions on the death
penalty. It also contains a brief overview of the history of the Eighth
Amendment, capital laws and procedures, and the capital punishment
debate. The appendix contains facts and figures on murder and the death
penalty. Cases discussed that are relevant to this bibliography include:
Stanfordv. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Fordv. Wainwright,477 U.S.
399 (1986); and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989).

Gina A. Leahy, Comment, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 890 (1989).
After analyzing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), the author
of this comment concludes the decision provides necessary guidance for
state legislatures and courts. She recognizes the broad scope of the
decision but asserts prior case law and societal norms support the
prohibition on executing juveniles under sixteen.
Gregory B. Leong and Spencer Eth, Behavioral Science and the Juvenile
Death Penalty, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 301 (1989).
The authors argue behavioral science data does not support the abolition
of thejuvenile death penalty. They assert it shows that the cognitive and
moral development of adolescents is comparable to adults, and that the
neuropsychiatric symptoms in condemned juveniles cannot be
sufficiently distinguished from those in condemned adults.
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Jennifer Seibring Marcotte, Comment, Death Penalty For Minors: Who
Should Decide?, 20 S. 1Il. U. L.J. 621 (1996).
After a look at the historical application of the death penalty to juveniles,
the author argues the Supreme Court should review its decision that
prohibits the execution of juveniles under sixteen. She asserts crimes
committed by juveniles are increasingly violent and sophisticated. She
argues Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), have limited the power of state
legislators to pass laws in the best interests of their citizens, and that the
position assumed by the Court is improper. She concludes the age of the
offender should be a mitigating factor rather than an absolute ban on
executions.
Rodger A. Maynes, Comment, The Death Penalty For Juveniles - A
ConstitutionalAlternative, 7 J. Juv. L. 54 (1983).
This comment argues the juvenile death penalty is a constitutional and
effective means for protecting society from hard-core juvenile offenders.
The author asserts the juvenile justice system fails when confronted with
juveniles who are experienced, sophisticated, and rehabilitative failures.
He argues the solution to the problem is the transfer of juveniles to adult
court where they may be subjected to the death penalty. He asserts that
the fact that juvenile offenders have been sentenced to death in the past
proves the execution of juveniles is not repugnant to the evolving
standards of decency. He argues age is not conclusive of a person's
maturity or criminal intent.
Maria P. Menard, Note, ProceduralDue Process For Juveniles on Death
Row: A Matter of Life and Death, 23 NEw ENG. L. REv. 943 (1988-1989).
The author of this note examines the problems inherent in the current
methods for transferring juvenile offenders to adult courts and the
constitutionality of subjecting juveniles to the death penalty. She argues
that because juveniles transferred to adult courts are subjected to adult
penalties, but lack procedural due process protections, it is
unconstitutional to execute them. She asserts it is contrary to the
philosophy behind the juvenile court system. She proposes that the due
process requirement of a hearing, an attorney, and a right to counsel be
applied to all juvenile transfer methods. She further argues the death
penalty as applied to juveniles is unconstitutional because: there is a
national consensus against juvenile executions, minors are in need of
special consideration and protection, and the juvenile death penalty fails
to serve the penological goals of deterrence and retribution.
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Edward Miller, Note, Executing Minors and the Mentally Retarded: The
Retributionand DeterrenceRationales, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 15 (1990).
This note looks at Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and concludes the Supreme Court erred
in its assessment of the deterrent and retributive values of sentencing to
death juveniles and the mentally retarded. The author gives a
background of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, focusing on the
evolution of the deterrent and retributive analysis. He criticizes Justices
O'Connor and Scalia for abandoning the penological purpose test in
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). He looks at Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and argues Justice O'Connor distorts the
penological purpose test. The author then performs his own analysis and
finds that the characteristics of juveniles and the mentally retarded
preclude the required level of culpability necessary for the death penalty.
He argues this lesser culpability does not fulfill the goal of retribution.
He also argues that the poor impulse control, lack of strategic thinking,
and difficulty seeing their mortality means it is unlikely the goal of
deterrence is served by executing juveniles and the mentally retarded.
Salvatore J. Modica, New York's Death Penalty: The Age Requirement, 13 ST.
JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 585 (1999).
The author examines the New York death penalty statute requirement
that the defendant be "more than eighteen years old" and concludes the
language means it applies to defendants as of the date of their eighteenth
birthday. In the course of his analysis, the author concludes the phrase
is ambiguous and the legislative intent cannot be read on the plain face
of the statute. By looking at previous New York death penalty statutes,
statutes with similar age based language, and at New York case law, he
concludes the legislative intent was to include defendants eighteen and
older at the time the crime was committed.
Etta J. Mullin, Note, At What Age Should They Die? The United States
Supreme Court Decision With Respect to Juvenile Offenders and the Death
Penalty, 16 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 161 (1990).
This note looks at Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and
concludes juveniles should not be executed because they are not as
culpable as adults. After an overview ofjuvenile justice and the juvenile
death penalty, the author analyzes Stanford. She argues the evolving
standards of decency analysis is too difficult to define. She asserts
statistics can be manipulated to come to different conclusions and that
legislative trends and public opinion are too uncertain. She proposes the
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better approach is the proportionality analysis. She argues the juvenile
death penalty is always disproportionate because juvenile offenders are
always less culpable than adults.
NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE ANDEDUCATIONFUND, DEATH Row U.S.A. (2000).
The NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Defense Fund publishes a
quarterly report on death row statistics and cases. The statistics
compiled include the number and percentage of juveniles on death row.
The report includes summaries of significant criminal, habeas, and
constitutional cases. The report also compiles statistics on those
executed and contains state lists of prisoners on death row. The state
lists identify juveniles.
Gino J. Naldi, The U.S. Supreme Court, the Execution of Juveniles and
Human Rights, 19 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 345 (1990).
This article examines Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and
concludes the decision was incompatible with human rights standards.
The author looks at international instruments such as the Geneva
Convention, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
American Convention on Human Rights. He concludes the United States
is not per se bound by these treaties, but he argues a norm of customary
international law prohibitingjuvenile executions exists and is binding on
the United States He also argues the prohibition of juvenile executions
may be jus cogens.
Ved P. Nanda, The United States Reservationto the Ban on the Death Penalty
For Juvenile Offenders: An Appraisal Under the InternationalCovenant on
Civil and PoliticalRights, 42 DEPAuL L. REv. 1311 (1993).
After an overview of United States death penalty jurisprudence, the
author examines the emerging international standards on the execution
ofjuveniles. The author looks at the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Geneva Convention, Convention on the Rights of the
Child, and U.N. resolutions. The article argues that at the time many of
these treaties were adopted, the United States had discontinued juvenile
executions and therefore any reservation to these agreements is
ineffective. The author also looks at the number of countries that have
abolished the juvenile death penalty and finds a consensus that
international law prohibits juvenile executions. She urges the United
States Senate to withdraw its reservation or alternatively that the
Supreme Court hold the juvenile death penalty violates the Eighth
Amendment.
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National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, Stop Killing Kids, at
http://www.ncadp.org/skkmenu.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2000).
This Web site is by a coalition of organizations and individuals trying to
abolish the death penalty. The Stop Killing Kids is a smaller site within
the larger more general anti-death penalty site. The National Coalition
to Abolish the Death Penalty (NCADP) states our national failure to
nurture and protect our children can be seen in every child on death row.
It decries the political reaction of lowering the age for the death penalty
instead of trying to remedy youth violence. It also points out the pattern
of racial discrimination in choosing which juveniles are sentenced to
death row. It asserts the United States commits human rights violations
each time it sentences a child to death. The site seeks to build an alliance
of groups and individuals to oppose the execution of juveniles. It
highlights particular cases.
Kha Q. Nguyen, Note, In Defense of the Child: A Jus CogensApproach to the
CapitalPunishmentofJuveniles in the UnitedStates, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L
L. &EcON. 401 (1995).
The author argues capital punishment of juveniles violates a norm of
international law. The author first discusses the capital punishment of
juveniles by examining Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988),
and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The author next defines
jus cogens. The author analyzes the law and practice of other nations,
international agreements, and decisions of international judicial bodies,
and concludes the exclusion of juveniles from capital punishment is ajus
cogens norm. The author concludes it is unlikely United States courts
would enforce ajus cogens norm but sees it being incorporated into the
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as part of the "evolving standards of
decency" analysis and as part of the proportionality strand.
Julian S. Nicholls, Comment, Too Young to Die: InternationalLaw and the
Impositionof the Juvenile Death Penalty in the UnitedStates, 5 EMORY INT'L
L. REV. 617 (1991).
After an examination of death penalty jurisprudence and the juvenile
death penalty's history, the author looks at international practice and
opinion. The author argues the international protests against the United
States juvenile death penalty, the fact that most countries ban the
execution of juveniles, human rights treaties, and U.N. resolutions,
demonstrate an international consensus against the juvenile death
penalty. The author sees the above as evidence of a norm of customary
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international law and argues that because the United States has failed to
dissent from the ban on the execution of juveniles from the beginning, it
does not qualify as a persistent dissenter. The author also argues the
prohibition on juvenile executions is jus cogens and binding on the
United States.
Jeff Noble, Note, 40 Drake L. Rev. 195 (1991).
This case note examines Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
The author concludes the case sets a bright line rule that executing
fifteen-year-olds violates the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual
punishments clause. He predicts that the constitutionality of the death
penalty for sixteen-and-seventeen-year-olds, will turn on whether the
state statute authorizing the death penalty includes a specific minimum
age.
Teresa L. Norris, Juvenile Executions: The United States' Violation of
International Law (1990) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University
of South Carolina Law Library).
This manuscript examines the juvenile death penalty in light of
international law and concludes the United States violates the human
rights of juvenile offenders by imposing capital sentences. After a
background on the juvenile death penalty in the United States, the author
looks at the major human rights treaties abolishing juvenile executions.
Although she finds the United States has not ratified any agreement
expressly prohibiting the juvenile death penalty, such a prohibition may
be enforced domestically because it is a customary international norm.
The author examines the proposition that the prohibition on juvenile
executions rises to the level ofjus cogens, and concludes it does not. She
does, however, find it is a customary international norm. In addition to
treaty evidence, she notes evidence that the majority of states do not
execute juveniles. She concludes the United States did not protest the
norm during its formation and is thus not exempt.
MARGARET OBERST, CHILDREN ON DEATH
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1987).

Row: THE FATE OF JUVENILE

This report is designed to give background information on juvenile
capital punishment and was compiled for the Council of State
Governments. It briefly summarizes the arguments on both sides of the
issues. It sets forth the state minimum ages for imposition of the death
penalty and gives statistics on the number of juveniles on death row and
executed.
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James R.P. Ogloff, The Juvenile Death Penalty: A FrustratedSociety's
Attempt for Control, 5 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 447 (1987).

This author looks at the juvenile death penalty and concludes it serves
very little logical purpose. He looks at juveniles currently on death row
and notes that in the majority of cases, the murder occurred during a
felony. He urges that empirical research is needed to specifically
evaluate a juvenile's decision making ability during the commission of
a felony in order to help determine their legal responsibility. He
questions the logic of executing a juvenile for a murder he or she may not
have intended. The author considers the various theories of punishment
and concludes less extreme methods of punishment would satisfy those
goals. He questions how the felony-murder ratio affects deterrence and
retribution.

RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1991).

This book on the death penalty is divided into five parts. Part I gives an
overview of capital punishment. Part !Idiscusses the legal challenges to
the death penalty pre-Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and
discusses legal challenges and reform of the death penalty after Gregg v.
Georgia. This part addresses mitigation evidence such as youth or
mental illness. This part also examines the execution of special groups
such as the mentally ill, mentally retarded, and juveniles. The Supreme
Court cases of Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Ford v.
Wainwright,477 U.S. 399 (1986); Thompson v. Oklahoma,487 U.S. 815

(1988); and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), are discussed.
Part Ill deals with racial discrimination and arbitrariness. Part IV
discusses arguments for and against the death penalty. Part V looks at
alternatives to capital punishment.
Dan Peelman, Note, Insight TowardJuvenile Death Penalty, 11 J. JUV. L. 78

(1990).
This note looks at Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), tracing the principles
developed in those two cases in order to gain insight into the Court's
decision in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and the
prohibition on executing minors under sixteen.
Dan Peelman, Note, Thompson v. Oklahoma: Juvenile Death PenaltyInsight

and Analysis, 11 J. JUv. L. 33 (1990).
After giving a very brief historical overview of the treatment ofjuvenile
offenders in the justice system, the author analyzes Thompson v.
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Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). He concludes by summarizing the
Court's findings.
Tanya M. Perfecky, Note, Children, the Death Penalty and the Eighth
Amendment: An Analysis of Stanford v. Kentucky, 35 VILL. L. REV. 641
(1990).
This note examines Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The
author asserts the plurality erred in failing to apply an excessiveness
analysis. The note discusses the two-prong test developed in Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and its application to juveniles. She
argues the Stanford plurality also improperly rejected consideration of
jury sentences and international norms when it examined the evolving
standards of decency.
Arthur E. Peterson, Note, Thompson v. Oklahoma: The Mitigating
Circumstancesof Youthful CapitalOffenders, 25 TULSA L.J. 115 (1989).
The author looks at Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and
concludes the Court should allow the states to establish procedures where
youth is a mitigating factor. He argues objective indicators of a national
consensus are inconclusive. He asserts the Thompson plurality failed to
address the collective victim when it determined the evolving standards
of decency. He argues establishing a minimum age for capital
punishment runs counter to Supreme Court policy towards minors. He
finds an age-based death penalty statute arbitrary and unjust, and asserts
the sentencer must focus on the juvenile's thought process. He urges
states to refine their death penalty statutes and sentencing procedures.
Charles A. Polen, Comment, Youth on Death Row: Waiver of Juvenile Court
Jurisdictionand Imposition ofthe Death Penaltyon Juvenile Offenders, 13 N.
KY. L. REv. 495 (1987).
This article discusses the juvenile court system and the transfer of
juveniles to adult criminal courts where they are subject to the death
penalty. The author asserts the juvenile justice system fails in
rehabilitating hard-core juvenile offenders, so transfer to adult courts is
necessary. He cautions, however, that transfer should not be done lightly
and that the waiving body should be given specific criteria to consider
when making that decision. He notes few death penalty statutes exempt
juveniles from execution, and he looks at the trend in state courts toward
allowing juvenile executions. He asserts that while age must be
considered a mitigating factor, it can be easily overcome by aggravating
circumstances. He looks at the justifications for capital punishment and
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concludes that retribution may apply to juvenile cases, but finds other
justifications questionable.
BARRETr PRETTYMAN, JR., DEATH AND THE SUPREME COURT (1961).
This book is an account of six death penalty cases that went before the
Supreme Court. One of the cases discussed is that of Willie Francis, an
African-American juvenile sentenced to death for a crime that took place
when he was fifteen. Louisiana's first attempt at electrocution failed and
his case eventually reached the Supreme Court. He was seventeen when
his death sentence was finally carried out.
Carol Daugherty Rasnic, The U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court and
CapitalPunishment: Should the U.S.A. Put the Death Penalty to Death?, 50
N. IR.LEGAL Q. 50 (1999).
This article gives an overview of important death penalty cases. In
particular it discusses Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988),
and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), concerning juveniles;
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), concerning the insane; and
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), concerning the mentally
retarded.
Paul Reidinger, The Death Row Kids, 75 A.B.A. J., Apr. 1989, at 78.
The author discusses the Supreme Court's splintered record on juvenile
death penalty cases, taking a close look at Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988). He sets
forth the facts and arguments in the Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989), briefs. He also reports the views of experts on the juvenile death
penalty.
Paul Reidinger, Fate of the Teenage Killers, 73 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1987, at 88.
The article summarizes the facts and arguments in Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), compares it to Eddings v. Oklahoma,
455 U.S. 104 (1982), and analyzes the Supreme Court Justices' voting
records on death penalty cases for the year.
Dominic J. Ricotta, Supreme Court Review, The Death Penaltyfor Juveniles:
A State's Right or a Child's Injustice?, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 921
(1988).
This case note analyzes Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988),
and concludes it was a positive development in juvenile justice. The
author comes to the conclusion that the Court needs to focus more on
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capacity, proportionality, and justice in its Eighth Amendment analysis
than on standards of justice.
Jeffrey L. Robinette, Note, Stanford v. Kentucky: Upholding Juvenile Capital
Punishment-A ConfirmationofSociety's "Evolving Standardsof Decency"?,
92 W. VA. L. REv. 205 (1989).
After looking at the juvenile court system and Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence, the author examines Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989). He argues the plurality interpreted objective data in a subjective
manner and so failed to reflect contemporary society's values. He asserts
Justice O'Connor's opinion was inconsistent with her holding in
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and that had she been
consistent, the Stanford decision would have been reversed.
Dinah A. Robinson and Otis H. Stephens, Patternsof Mitigating Factorsin
Juvenile Death Penalty Cases, 28 CRIM. L. BULL. 246 (1992).
This article looks at mitigating factors present in juvenile death penalty
cases. The authors studied ninety-one juvenile death penalty cases.
Some of the factors identified were: troubled family history and social
background, psychological disturbance, mental retardation, indigence,
and substance abuse. The authors argue the legal process did not ensure
adequate consideration of mitigating factors. They assert the Eighth
Amendment requires more than deference to legislative majorities. They
find no convincing rationale to assert the Eighth Amendment allows the
execution of sixteen-and-seventeen-year-olds.
Morna L. Bowman Rouse, Note, Thompson v. Oklahoma: A Special Place in
Society For Juveniles; Does It Include Death Row?, 9 CRIM. JUST. J. 371
(1987).
The author begins by discussing the two prong test for determining the
constitutionality of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment and
then moves on to the facts of Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815
(1988). She concludes by offering three alternative possible rulings:
prohibition of executing those under eighteen, prohibition of executing
those under sixteen, or a sentence of death but a re-evaluation of
juveniles when they reach eighteen to decide if the death sentence is
appropriate under the individual circumstances.

NORTHERN ILNOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21

WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1993).

This study analyzes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, international
humanitarian law, the European Convention of Human Rights, the

Geneva Convention, and other international law instruments. The author

discusses the emergence of customary norms prohibiting the death

penalty. He traces the development of the exclusion of certain categories
of persons from the death penalty. In particular, he looks at the exclusion
of juveniles and the insane. He predicts the prohibition of the death
penalty per se will be a customary international norm andjus cogens in
the future.
Steven M. Scott, Note, Evolving Standardsof Decency and the Death Penalty
For Juvenile Offenders: The Contradictions Presented by Stanford v.

Kentucky, 19 CAP. U. L. REv. 851 (1990).
The author examines Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and
concludes the plurality erred when it determined there is no national
consensus against the juvenile death penalty. He begins with a
background on juvenile executions and the juvenile justice system. He
then analyzes Stanford, taking issue with the plurality's exclusion of the
fifteen jurisdictions banning the death penalty. He argues the Court must
include all laws, not just those fitting a personal formula. After looking
at the states banning juvenile executions, states not actively executing
juveniles, the legislative trend toward prohibiting juvenile executions,
and jury reluctance to sentence juveniles to death, the author finds a
national consensus exists against the juvenile death penalty. He
criticizes the plurality for falling to discuss the Equal Protection Clause
and argues executing juveniles serves neither deterrence nor retribution.
Edward F. Sherman, Jr., Note, The U.S. Death Penalty Reservation to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Exposing the
Limitations of the Flexible System Governing Treaty Formation, 29 TEX.

INT'L L.J. 69 (1994).
This note looks at the United States' reservation to the prohibition on
executing juveniles in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). The author looks at the compatibility principle of treaty
ratification in the context of the United States' reservation. He notes the
Vienna Convention prohibits reservations incompatible with the object
and purpose of the treaty and thus, he finds the United States' reservation
unacceptable. He examines the flexible system of treaty formation and

20011

WALKING THE EDGE OF DEATH

notes the ability of powerful signatories to make excessively broad
reservations. He also looks at customary international law. He asserts
there is arguably a customary international law prohibition on executing
juveniles, but concedes the United States qualifies as a persistent
objector. However, he concludes the United States' reservation to the
treaty is void because it is incompatible with the object and purpose of
the ICCPR. He proposes several changes to the Vienna Convention in
an effort to end excessively broad reservations and to clarify when
reservations are incompatible.
Susan M. Simmons, Note, Thompson v. Oklahoma: Debating the
Constitutionalityof Juvenile Executions, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 737 (1989).
This case note outlines the history of recentjudicial decisions concerning
capital punishment, analyzes Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815
(1988), and examines its future impact on juvenile executions. The
author concludes that future execution of juveniles under sixteen is
inevitable.
Sandra Evans Skovron et al., The DeathPenaltyforJuveniles:An Assessment

of PublicSupport, 35 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 546 (1989).

The authors report findings from surveys of Cincinnati and Columbus,
Ohio that concern the juvenile death penalty. Three hundred adults from
each city were surveyed. In Cincinnati, 69% opposed legislation
allowing juveniles over fourteen to be executed, and in Columbus,
65.3%. The authors analyzed the survey respondents' demographic and
attitudinal characteristics.
Respondents who believed in the
effectiveness of rehabilitation programs were less likely to support the
juvenile death penalty. Men were more likely than women to support it.
The authors conclude legislators overestimate the support for harsh
penalties.

David Smith, Death Penaltyfor Teens: Is it Cruel and Unusual Punishment?
No, 75 A.B.A. J., June 1989, at 43.
This is an excerpt from Smith's brief on behalf of the state of Kentucky
in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). He argues that imposition
of the death penalty on juveniles does not violate the cruel and unusual
punishments clause.
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Tracy L. Snell, U.S. Dep't. Of Justice, Capital Punishment 1998 (1999),
availableat http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov:80/bjs/abstract/cp98.htm (last visited
Oct. 1, 2000).
This is an annual report issued by the Bureau of Justice Statistics. The
report covers characteristics of persons executed and persons under a
sentence of death. In particular, the report covers the minimum age in
death penalty statutes, ages of defendants at the time of arrest, and ages
of defendants under a sentence of death.
Michael J. Spillane, Note, The Execution ofJuvenile Offenders: Constitutional
and InternationalLaw Objections, 60 UMKC L. REV. 113 (1991).
After reviewing the history of juvenile executions, the author analyzes
the juvenile death penalty in light of the Eighth Amendment, Equal
Protection Clause, substantive due process, and customary international
law. He concludes executing minors violates the Eighth Amendment
because the juvenile death penalty does not fit within the evolving
standards of decency. He concludes the juvenile death penalty violates
the Equal Protection Clause because the execution of sixteen-andseventeen-year-olds is not rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose of deterrence or retribution. He concludes the juvenile death
penalty violates substantive due process because the type of offenders
selected for execution, combined with the methods of execution, shock
the conscience and are offensive to a sense of justice. He argues the
general practice of most nations prohibits the execution of juveniles, the
practice is accepted as required by law, and the United States has not
persistently or unambiguously objected to a ban on juvenile executions.
Thus, he concludes, the prohibition against executing juveniles is
customary international law and binding on the states. Furthermore, he
concludes the ban on executing juveniles is jus cogens and so basic that
no state is permitted to deviate from that principle.
Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker, Defending CategoricalExemptions to the
Death Penalty: Reflections on the ABA's Resolutions Concerning the
Execution of Juveniles and Persons With Mental Retardation, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1998 at 89.
In this article the authors argue juveniles and the mentally retarded
should be exempted from the death penalty. They discuss Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence and the weaknesses of the proportionality
analysis. They argue the American Bar Association and others seeking
to ban executions of juveniles and the mentally retarded, should focus
their arguments on the following doctrinal requirements: narrowing the
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class eligible, channeling the discretion of capital sentencers, ensuring
the consideration of mitigating factors, and securing heightened
reliability.
Suzanne D. Strater, The Juvenile Death Penalty: In the Best Interests of the
Child?, 26 Loy. U. CIl. L.J. 147 (1995).
After giving an overview of the history of the juvenile death penalty and
the legal background of its constitutionality battles, the author discusses
traditional criticisms of the juvenile death penalty. She then focuses on
the state's duty to protect children. She identifies three absolutes
distilled from non-capital areas ofjuvenile law, and concludes the state's
role as parenspatriae conflicts with any imposition of the juvenile death
penalty. She proposes the states and the Supreme Court use the best
interests of the child standard in juvenile capital cases.
Victor L. Streib, Capital Punishment of Children in Ohio: "They'd Never
Send a Boy of Seventeen to the ChairIn Ohio, Would They?", 18 AKRON L.
REv. 51 (1984).
This article is by Victor Streib, an expert in the area of the juvenile death
penalty. He begins with an overview of the evolution of capital
punishment and the development of the juvenile justice system. He then
focuses on Ohio's history of juvenile executions, looking at each of the
nineteen cases individually. He compares the Ohio cases with
nationwide cases and applauds Ohio's decision to prohibit juvenile
executions. He concludes by urging other states to prohibit juvenile
executions.
VICTOR L. STREiB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES (1987).
This book is an in-depth study of the juvenile death penalty. The author
begins by looking at the juvenile justice system, the waiver of juveniles
into adult criminal court, and the constitutionality ofjuvenile executions.
He concludes the Eighth Amendment prohibits the death penalty for
juveniles and that eighteen should be the cut-off. He explores state laws,
focusing on those statutes in death penalty jurisdictions. He discusses
actual executions and then looks at the characteristics of the crimes,
offenders, and victims. He examines a number of cases in depth. He
then analyzes the evolution of juvenile executions in Ohio. In the last
section of the book, the author addresses the future of the juvenile death
penalty. He suggests criteria for future decisions concerning thejuvenile
death penalty.
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Victor L. Streib, The Juvenile Death Penalty Today: Death Sentences and
Executions for Juvenile Crimes, January 1, 1973 - June 30, 2000, at
http://www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/juvdeath.htm (June 30, 2000) (on file
with the author).
This report gives the characteristics of juvenile offenders who have been
executed or are on death row. The author cautions that juvenile
execution data is complete; however, the juvenile sentencing data and
data for juvenile offenders currently on death row may be incomplete.
The tables and appendix offer such information as name, execution, race,
crime, place, minimum death penalty ages by jurisdiction, state by state
breakdowns of juvenile death sentences, death sentences imposed,
characteristics of offenders and victims, and case summaries. The author
also comments on the historical background of the juvenile death
penalty, legal context, juvenile death penalty in other countries, and
rationales for and against the juvenile death penalty. This report is
available only on the Internet and the author updates it regularly.
Victor L. Streib, Juveniles on Death Row, reprintedin YOUNG BLOOD 167
(Shirley Dicks ed., 1995).
The author looks at juveniles on death row and discusses their abusive
backgrounds and poor representation by counsel. He examines the case
of Charles Rumbaugh. He points to the trend toward excluding juveniles
from the death penalty. He asserts alternative solutions to juvenile
violence are needed, such as long-term prison sentences.
Victor L. Streib, Excluding Juveniles From New York's Impendent Death
Penalty, 54 ALBANY L. REV. 625 (1990).
The author looks at the national history of the death penalty and provides
tables of information on the executions of juvenile offenders. He
examines New York's history of using the death penalty and looks at five
New York juvenile executions. He asserts capital punishment for
juveniles has been historically rare in the United States and argues the
majority of states prohibit them. He discusses jury sentencing patterns
and points out their rarity. He notes that leaders of legal, criminological,
and social policy are opposed to the juvenile death penalty. He argues
executing juveniles does not support the penological goals of retribution
and deterrence. After analyzing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815
(1988), and Stanfordv. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), he critiques their
analytical schemes. He suggests that New York consider alternatives to
execution and concludes that if New York is going to impose the death
penalty, it should establish a minimum age of eighteen.
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Victor L. Streib and Lynn Sametz, Executing Female Juveniles, 22 CONN. L.
REv. 3 (1989).
The authors focus on female juveniles and capital punishment, and
conclude that ending the death penalty for all juveniles is the only
rational response to the phenomenon of society's extreme reluctance to

execute female juveniles. They look at Uniform Crime Report studies

and find that over 99% of the juvenile females exposed to the possibility

of death were not sentenced to death. They provide information on the
ten executed female juveniles and look at the individual cases of each of

these girls. The authors argue there is a gender bias against men, not
women, and that a more effective constitutional challenge to the death
penalty for women is their status as juveniles. The authors attribute
gender bias to the fact that mitigating factors tend to match the female
juvenile's crime, while aggravating factors work against male juvenile
offenders. They also acknowledge the ingrained cultural tendency to be
more lenient with female offenders. They conclude the death penalty for
female juveniles has been effectively prohibited due to the reluctance to
impose death on female juveniles.
Victor L. Streib, Executing Women, Children,andthe Retarded: Second Class

Citizens in Capital Punishment,in AMERICA'S ExPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 201 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998).

This chapter looks at three frequently excluded classes from capital
punishment: women, children, and the mentally retarded. The author
examines the social policies and realities behind the reluctance to
execute people in these groups. As part of his analysis, the author gives
statistics on members of each group on death row or executed. He also
gives historical backgrounds. The policies he looks at are culpability,
legislative enactments, jury sentences, public opinion polls, and the
penological goals of incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution. He
concludes that the reasons for screening out juveniles and the mentally
retarded are more justifiable than those for women.

Victor L. Streib, Imposing the Death Penalty on Children, in CHALLENGING
CAPITAL PuNIsHMENT

245 (Kenneth C. Haas and James A. Inciardi eds.,

1988).
This chapter looks at the juvenile death penalty and condemns it. The
author examines waiver into adult criminal court and briefly summarizes
the Supreme Court cases Gregg v. Georgia,428 U.S. 153 (1976); Jurek
v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); and
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982). He also looks at state death
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penalty statutes and their minimum ages. He argues the punishment
justifications of deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and rehabilitation
are not applicable for juveniles in death penalty situations due to the
characteristics of juveniles. He asserts a bright line must be drawn and
urges that line to be set at age eighteen. He gives a historical and present
day analysis of juveniles under a sentence of death or executed. He
concludes by suggesting alternative solutions to the problem of juvenile
violence.
Victor L. Streib, Juveniles' Attitudes Toward Their Impending Executions, in
FACING THE DEATH PENALTY

38 (Michael L. Radelet ed., 1989).

In this chapter, the author examines juvenile responses to death
sentences. He begins with a history of the juvenile death penalty in the
United States and a summary of recent juvenile death sentences. Thirtyfour juvenile death penalty cases were studied and six categories of
responses were distilled from these cases: indifference, resignation, fear
and abandonment, religious conversion, pride and defiance, and
penitence and acceptance. He uses individual cases to illustrate these
categories.

Victor L. Streib, MoratoriumOn the Death PenaltyForJuveniles, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. Autumn 1998, at 55.
This article looks at the American Bar Association's proposed
moratorium on the death penalty and considers the appropriateness of a
moratorium on the juvenile death penalty. The author offers a history of
the juvenile death penalty and looks at death penalty statutes. He
provides tables with information concerning death penalty age limits,
juvenile executions, and characteristics of offenders. He suggests a
better alternative to the juvenile death penalty would be incarceration for
twenty-five years with possibility of parole, or working with
communities to prevent juvenile crime. The author's appendix includes
juvenile death sentences imposed from Jan. 1, 1973 to June 1, 1989, and
case summaries for current juvenile death row inmates.
Victor L. Streib, Sentencing Juvenile Murderers:Punishthe Last Offender or
Save the Next Victim, 26 U. ToL. L. REv. 765 (1995).
This article is an edited version of the 1995 Juvenile Law Symposium
lecture given by Victor L. Streib. The article begins with a discussion of
juvenile crime and the American fascination with violence. The speaker
then discusses nonrational reactions to juvenile homicide, such as the
juvenile death penalty, the tough on crime approach, and the focus on
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retribution. He asserts rational reactions and solutions should come from
careful research and an increase in resources to fight the problem. He
argues the juvenile death penalty and other draconian punishments
should be rejected. He points to youthfulness and immaturity as
mitigating factors. He suggests the focus be on reformand rehabilitation.
The article concludes with a question and answer session.
Michael D. Strugatz, Comment, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 237 (1990).
This note looks at Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and
concludes the Court correctly refused to prohibit executions of sixteenand-seventeen-year-olds. The author asserts the Court correctly relied on
only objective indicia when looking at the evolving standards of decency.
He argues the defendants could only offer speculative and incalculable
data.
ROBERT H. THOMAS AND JOHN

D. HUTCHESON, JR., GEORGIA RESIDENTS'

ATrITUDES TOWARD THE DEATH PENALTY, THE DISPOSITION OF JUVENILE

(1986).
This report provides the findings of a sample of over 900 Georgia
residents. Forty-one questions were asked concerning: the crime rate and
judicial system; imprisonment and the death penalty; judicial process,
imprisonment, and the death penalty for juvenile offenders; fairness of
the death penalty; and alternatives to the death penalty. The relevant
responses were as follows: 75% of the respondents believe there was an
increase in juvenile crime; 75% are in favor of the death penalty,
however, respondents split when asked whether juveniles and adults
should get the same punishment; 48% think juveniles should not get the
death penalty; 27% stated it depended on the situation; 66% believe the
mentally retarded should not receive the death penalty.

OFFENDERS, AND RELATED ISSUES

University of Alaska Anchorage Justice Center, Focus On the Death Penalty,
at http://www.uaa.alaska.edu/just/death/issues.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2000).
This Web site attempts to provide links to resources from both sides of
the death penalty debate. This particular area of the site addresses
specific issues. In addition to information on deterrence; retribution and
justice for murder victims; the innocent; limiting appeals and habeas
corpus reform; costs of the death penalty; alternative sentencing;
fairness; moratorium; cruel and unusual punishment; and women, the site
provides links to statistical information and cases concerning juveniles,
the mentally retarded, and the mentally ill.
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Lawrence A. Vanore, Note, The Decency of CapitalPunishmentfor Minors:
Contemporary Standards and the Dignity of Juveniles, 61 IND. L.J. 757
(1986).
This note contains an Eighth Amendment analysis of the juvenile death
penalty. The author concludes that treating age as a mitigating factor is
insufficient to guarantee the constitutionality of the juvenile death
penalty, and that the death penalty is always inappropriate for juveniles.
Kathleen M. Walker, Note, The Bright Line Has Been Drawn For Juvenile
Executions: Thompson v. Oklahoma, 23 CREIGHTON L. REV. 69 (1989/1990).
This note offers a review of juvenile executions and Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence before analyzing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815
(1988). After examining the case, the author concludes the application
and conclusion of the three-part Eighth Amendment test was flawed. She
argues the dissent's analysis should have prevailed. She criticizes the
plurality for ignoring the possibility that the federal government and nine
states, which had no minimum age for execution, had intended juveniles
transferred to adult court to be eligible for the death penalty. The author
also asserts the plurality erred when it assumed a jury's reluctance to
impose the death penalty on juveniles was an indication of the evolving
standards of decency. She argues the plurality should have treated age
as a mitigating factor rather than drawing a bright line.
William M. White Jr., Case Comment, Eddings v. Oklahoma: A Stay of
Executionfor Juveniles?, 9 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Civ. CONFINEMENT 407
(1983).
This case comment examines Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104
(1982). The author views the case as clarifying the mitigation language
in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), but falling to address the issue
of whether juveniles should be put to death. The author looks at the
issue through such considerations as suspect classification, right to life,
due process, the juvenile justice system, retribution, and rehabilitation.
The comment concludes juveniles should not be executed under any
circumstances.
William Wilson, Note, Juvenile Offenders andthe Electric Chair:Cruel and
UnusualPunishmentor Firm DisciplineForthe Hopelessly Delinquent?, 35
U. FLA. L. REV. 344 (1983).
This note examines the constitutionality of juvenile executions. The
author begins by discussing juvenile waiver mechanisms. He asserts the
procedural safeguards invoked in judicial waiver, along with the
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criticism of the lack of safeguards in legislative and prosecutorial waiver,
demonstrate societal rejection of adult punishment for juveniles. He
performs an Eighth Amendment analysis and concludes that public
opinion, as evinced through the establishment of the juvenile justice
system, jury reluctance to impose death sentences on juveniles, and state
statutes, rejects the execution of juveniles. He also looks at judicial
attitudes and Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), finding both
imply a rejection of capital punishment for minors. Finally, the author
looks to the deterrent effect and retributive value of juvenile executions
and concludes neither justifies the juvenile death penalty.
Alisa Winders, State v. Shaw: The Status of Juvenile Executions, 10 AM. J.
TRiAL ADvOc. 171 (1986).
In this article, the author uses State v. Shaw, 255 S.E.2d 799 (S.C. 1979),
to illustrate how juvenile murderers are processed through adult courts.
She notes the only time James Terry Roach's age came up was during the
penalty phase of his trial. She examines the constitutionality of juvenile
capital punishment. She reports both sides of the arguments on the
juvenile death penalty. She concludes juveniles should not be executed
until the Supreme Court makes a final determination on the
constitutionality of juvenile executions.
Lisa J.S. Wright, Killing Children: Juveniles and the Death Penalty (1996)
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Southwest Texas State University)(on file with the
Southwest Texas State University Library).
This thesis looks at the purpose, theories, and application of the death
penalty to juveniles. The author explores arguments for and against
executing juveniles. She closely examines United States Supreme Court
death penalty decisions and the history ofjuvenile executions. She looks
at the juvenile justice system and waiver into adult criminal court. She
argues that juveniles in death eligible cases should be given individual
consideration but should not be given a blanket exemption from the death
penalty.
YOUNG BLOOD: JUVENILE JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY (SHIRLEY DiCKs
ED., 1995).
Shirley Dicks, editor of this book, has a son on death row. She, deathrow inmates, families of victims and offenders, religious and political
leaders, journalists, criminologists and legal experts present arguments
againstjuvenile executions and offer alternative methods of dealing with
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juvenile violence. Relevant chapters of this book are individually listed
in this bibliography.
II. MENTALLY ILL
A. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES AND LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT
CASE

Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
In this death penalty case, the indigent defendant planned to raise the
insanity defense and requested a psychiatric evaluation at state expense.
The trial court denied his motion. The Court held that when an indigent
defendant has made a preliminary showing that sanity at the time of the
offense may be a significant factor at trial, the state must provide a
mental health professional's assistance. Chief Justice Burger concurred,
limiting the holding to the facts of the case. Justice Rehnquist dissented,
preferring to limit the rule to capital cases and to an independent
psychiatric evaluation, rather than have the psychiatrist act as an assistant
to the defense.
Caritativo v. California, 357 U.S. 549 (1958).
This pre-Fordv. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), case affirmed the
adequacy of the California procedures to determine sanity for execution,
which were vested in the warden. Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, and
Brennan dissented, questioning Solesbee v. Balcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950),
and finding the California procedures violated the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
The defendant in this death penalty case was determined competent to
stand trial after a court ordered psychiatric examination. The defendant
was found guilty, and at the penalty phase, the doctor who conducted the
pretrial examination testified as to the defendant's future dangerousness.
The defendant was then sentenced to death. The Court held the
admission of the doctor's testimony during the penalty phase violated the
defendant's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and Sixth
Amendment right to counsel because he was not advised of his rights
before the pretrial psychiatric examination.
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
A habeas corpus petition was filed on behalf of defendant Alvin Ford
after a competency hearing failed to stay his execution. After looking to
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the evolving standards of decency, the Court held the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the execution of the insane. The Court also found that Florida's
procedures for determining sanity were inadequate because they
precluded an opportunity to be heard. The Justices split, however, in
their suggestions of what type of procedure might be adequate. Justices
Powell and O'Connor wrote separate concurring opinions. Justice
Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger dissented. The dissent found there
was no Eighth Amendment right for insane persons to be exempt from
execution. They also found Florida's procedures for determining sanity
adequate in light of previous precedent and the common law.
Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
The defendant, a convicted murderer who had been sentenced to death,
waived all appeals. His mother filed a petition for a stay of execution on
his behalf. The Court found nothing in the record to indicate Gilmore
was incompetent and found that he knowingly and intelligently waived
his rights to seek an appeal of his death sentence. Thus, the Court held
his mother had no standing to seek relief on his behalf. Justices White,
Brennan and Marshall dissented, finding there were serious questions
about the constitutionality of the Utah death penalty statute and about
Gilmore's competency. Gilmore's life was the subject of Norman
Mailer's Pulitzer prize winning novel, The Executioner'sSong.
Louisiana v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746 (La. 1992).
The condemned inmate challenged an order to medicate him against his
will with antipsychotic drugs in order to execute him. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated the order and remanded for
further consideration in light of Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210
(1990). The trial court reinstated the order and the inmate appealed. The
Louisiana Supreme Court held that an order to forcibly medicate a
prisoner with antipsychotic drugs violated his right to privacy or
personhood and constituted cruel and unusual punishment under the state
constitution.
Nobles v. Georgia, 168 U.S. 398 (1897).
This pre-Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), case held that a
suggestion of post-conviction insanity did not give a condemned prisoner
the right to have the sanity resolved by a full trial. The Court found
Georgia's procedures did not violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
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Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1990).
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear a case concerning a
Louisiana court order to forcibly medicate a condemned inmate in order
to induce competency so that he could be executed. The Court vacated
the judgment and remanded the decision for further consideration in light
of Washington v. Harper,494 U.S. 210 (1990).
Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 (1948).
This pre-Fordv. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), case addresses the
issue of the adequacies of procedures in determining restoration of
competency for execution. The Court held that reasonable discretion
must be granted to the state tribunal in determining whether a full inquiry
and hearing on the sanity of a condemned inmate is necessary. Justices
Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge concurred.
Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
This pre-Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), case dealt with
procedures necessary for a competency to be executed hearing. The
Court held that the Georgia statute, giving its governor the power to
decide questions of sanity for execution purposes, was adequate due
process.
Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
This Supreme Court case deals with a noncapital case, however, it has
implications for competency for execution. A mentally ill prisoner
challenged prison policy which involuntarily medicated him with
antipsychotic drugs, claiming it violated his due process rights. The
Court held involuntary medication did not violate due process if the
inmate is dangerous to himself or others and the treatment is in his
medical interest. The Court also held that due process does not demand
a judicial hearing before involuntarily medicating an inmate. Justice
Blackmun concurred. Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall concurred
in part and dissented in part.
B. ARTICLES, BOOKS, AND WEB SITES

A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS COMM., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL
HEALTH STANDARDS (1989).

The American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards Committee
developed ninety-six standards for dealing with the mentally
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disadvantaged in the criminal justice system. The standards address
post-arrest obligations, pretrial evaluations, expert testimony, disclosures
from pretrial mental evaluations, competence to stand trial, postconviction determinations of competency, stays of execution, and
restoration of competency. The standards also discuss competency and
confessions and nonresponsibility for crime. The standards look at the
sentencing of mentally ill and mentally retarded offenders. They discuss
treatment, admissibility of pretrial assessments, and the right to refuse
treatment.
James R. Acker and Charles S. Lanier, Unfit to Live, Unfit to Die:
Incompetency For Execution Under Modem Death Penalty Legislation, 33
CRIM. L. BULL. 107 (1997).
This article addresses the issue of claims of incompetency by condemned
prisoners. The authors look at existing standards for determining
competency and rationales for prohibiting the execution of the insane.
They suggest the prisoner's custodian should have a duty to raise
incompetency and other parties should also be able to raise this issue.
They argue the courts should determine whether a hearing is needed to
decide competency. They assert independent experts should be used to
evaluate the prisoners and that court appointed experts for prisoners
should be required. The authors suggest that judges should be the fact
finders for resolving incompetency claims. They argue the prisoner
should be given advance notice of a hearing and prisoners should have
the assistance of counsel while on death row. They also assert cross
examination should be allowed. They place the burden of proof on the
prisoner to establish incompetency by a preponderance of the evidence,
and assert that expedited appeals should be allowed. The authors suggest
incompetent prisoners should have their sentences commuted for life, and
they discuss the issue surrounding forced medication to establish
competency for execution.
Amnesty International, Amnesty International Website Against the Death
Penalty, at http://www.web.anesty.org/rmp/dplibrary.nsf/index (last visited
Oct. 1, 2000).
This site contains extensive substantive information concerning the death
penalty. Amnesty International reports on the death penalty are available
in their Web site library going back to 1996. These reports cover many
death penalty issues, including those concerning the mentally ill,
mentally retarded, and juveniles.
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THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS ET AL., BREACH OF TRUST:
PHYSICIAN PARTICIPATION IN EXECUTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES (1994).

This report by The American College of Physicians, Human Rights
Watch, The National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, and
Physicians for Human Rights looks at the nature and extent of physician
participation in capital punishment. The report begins with a brief
history of physician involvement in executions. Following this is a
summary of medical professional organization responses to physician
participation in executions. The report looks at state statutes and
regulations concerning the death penalty and physicians. The
organizations interviewed witnesses to recent executions and conclude
current execution procedures require physicians to violate professional
ethics standards. The report notes institution employed physicians suffer
when they refuse to participate. The report contains an ethical analysis
of the participation problem, paying special attention to psychiatric
evaluation and treatment of the condemned. The report concludes state
law and regulations directly conflict with ethical standards. It
recommends changes in the laws to accommodate professional ethics.

AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

(James R. Acker et al.

eds., 1998).
This book looks at the experiment of capital punishment post-Furmanv.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and discusses its failures. The chapters,
which are written by different authors, examine public opinion, law,
politics, deterrence, incapacitation and future dangerousness, women,
children, the mentally retarded, the innocent, incompetent counsel, deathqualified juries, mitigation, discrimination, habeas corpus, cost of the
death penalty, physician involvement, families of victims and offenders,
life on death row, clemency, and executions. Chapters relevant to this
bibliography have been individually cited.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AI INDEX: AMR
AMERICA: THE DEATH PENALTY (1987).

51/01/87, UNITED STATES OF

This book gives an overview of the death penalty in America. It contains
a chapter on juvenile death sentences, discussing United States domestic
standards, the Roach case, and International practice. It also contains a
chapter on the execution of the mentally ill, covering five cases. The
appendices contain summaries of important United States Supreme Court
rulings and death penalty statistics.
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Paul S. Applebaum, Competence to Be Executed: Another Conundrum For
Mental Health Professionals, 37 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 682
(1986).
Dr. Applebaum discusses the dilemmas facing mental health
professionals who evaluate or treat incompetent condemned inmates. He
looks at the three different positions professionals might take on the
issues. He offers two possible resolutions: commuting the sentences of
the incompetent condemned, and abolishing the requirement that
prisoners be competent for execution. He concludes by urging the
profession to try to come to a consensus on an acceptable system.
Bruce A. Arrigo and Christopher R. Williams, Law, Ideology, and Critical
Inquiry: The Case of Treatment Refusal ForIncompetent PrisonersAwaiting
Execution, 25 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 367 (1999).
This article examines the issue of forced medication of condemned
inmates through the lense of discourse analysis. The authors assert all
language is method and hidden assumptions and implicit values within
text can be deciphered through an analysis of the words used. They
provide a detailed overview of two methods of discourse analysis:
structural semiotics and deconstructionism. They apply these methods
and conclude "mental illness," "incompetence," and "execution" are
words with complex and nuanced meanings that reveal contradictions,
ambiguities and inconsistencies. They suggest reevaluating the
assumptions behind law's selection of language before considering
changes in the law.
James C. Beck, The Role of Psychiatry in Death Penalty Defense, 21 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRIC L. 453 (1993).
This article discusses the roles psychiatrists can play in capital defense
cases. He argues the psychiatrist's primary function when doing capital
defense work is to gather data for mitigation purposes. He uses
individual cases to illustrate the importance of psychiatric defense in the
early stages of the trial.
Michael Benjamin, Comment, ConstitutionalLaw: Extent of ProceduralDue
ProcessRequired to Adjudge the Competency of a Condemned Prisoner,38
U. FLA. L. REV. 681 (1986).
This case comment examines Fordv. Wainwright,477 U.S. 399 (1986).
In the background discussion, the author looks at the due process
safeguards developed in Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972);
Gardnerv. Florida,430 U.S. 349 (1977); and Ake v. Oklahoma,470 U.S.
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68 (1985). He ends by suggesting what due process most likely requires
when a condemned inmate claims insanity.
Ellen Fels Berkman, Note, Mental Illness as an Aggravating Circumstancein
CapitalSentencing, 89 CoLUM. L. REV. 291 (1989).
This note explores the problem of mental illness being presented as a
mitigating factor but being considered an aggravating factor. The author
first looks at statutory schemes involving the death penalty and
aggravating-mitigating circumstances. She posits that one reason so
many inmates on death row are mentally ill is that the defendant's
mitigating evidence of mental illness was considered as an aggravating
factor. She argues the Supreme Court has indicated that a capitalsentencing statute cannot term mental illness an aggravating factor, and
this leads to the conclusion that the factors resulting from mental illness
cannot be used as aggravating circumstances. She proposes a statutory
scheme where the defendant would bear the burden of producing
evidence of mental illness and of a causal relationship between
aggravating factors and the defendant's mental illness. The state would
have to show that the circumstances it relies on for a death sentence are
unrelated to the defendant's mental illness.
Anthony J. Bishop, Comment, Ford v. Wainwright: Insanity of the DeathRow
Inmate - A Second Chance?, 11 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 311 (1987).
This comment examines Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and
Johnson v. Cabana,481 U.S. 1061 (1987) in an effort to determine what
Ford did concerning condemned inmates claiming insanity. First, the
author distinguishes Fordfrom Cabana. Then, he discusses the history
of the prohibition on executing the insane. He looks at statutory
provisions concerning the procedures for insanity determinations and at
Ford'seffects on such procedures. He concludes that Ford gives the
condemned inmate the right to present evidence and witnesses, the right
to be represented by counsel, and the opportunity to cross-examine
witnesses. The author does not believe Fordprovided more protection
than the common law prohibition on executing the insane.
M. Gregg Bloche, Psychiatry, Capital Punishment, and the Purposes of
Medicine, 16 J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 301 (1993).
The author discusses the ethical dilemmas confronting psychiatrists in
capital cases. He first looks at the history of psychiatric involvement in
capital cases. He places this involvement within the larger phenomenon
of medical discretion as social gatekeeping. He identifies the various
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forms of psychiatric involvement and then discusses the resulting ethical
harm. He examines the forensic psychiatrists' ethic of truth guideline
and finds a tension between truthfulness and the commitment to helping
people. He asserts medical ethics must protect against the undermining
of social confidence in the profession. The author examines forensic
psychiatric practice in capital cases and argues capital punishment risks
moral integrity and professional credibility to such a degree that
psychiatrists should not participate. He proposes tentative ethical
guidelines.
James A. Boles, The Ford Case CapitalPunishment and the Mentally Ill in

Nevada, 52 INTER-ALIA, Nov./Dec. 1987, at Fl.

The author looks at a Nevada case involving a mentally ill woman and
concludes imposing the death penalty was disproportionate and
excessive. He argues the mentally ill defendant found legally sane for
trial, sentencing, and execution, deserves special protection because the
death penalty does not serve a retributive or deterrent purpose and the
punishment is disproportionate and excessive. The author compares this
case with another Nevada case where a similarly mentally ill defendant's
sentence was commuted. He finds the two cases too similar to warrant
such different results. He finds the punishment of death disproportionate
and excessive because the defendant's level of intent did not rise to the
level of requiring the death penalty due to her psychiatric problems.

Richard J. Bonnie, Healing-KillingConflicts: Medical Ethics and the Death

Penalty, HASTINGS CrR. REP., May/June 1990, at 12.

This essay is based on a paper presented to the annual meeting of the
American Psychological Law Society. The author argues that the ethical
argument against mental health professionals participating in capital
cases should be carefully examined. He asserts participation in death
penalty cases is no different than participation in other criminal cases.
While he recognizes personal moral scruples may cause the mental health
professional to abstain, he sees no ethical problem in their participation
in capital cases. He refutes arguments by other commentators who view
participation in capital cases as unethical. He finds some problems with
both the always treat and never treat capital prisoners positions and finds
them ethically flawed. He advocates the sometimes treat position. He
also addresses the question of why insane prisoners are not just executed
and concludes the justification for this prohibition must be in the dignity
of the condemned. He looks at the costs of mental health professional
abstention from capital cases and finds it too high.
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Richard J. Bonnie, Psychiatryand the Death Penalty: Emerging Problemsin
Virginia, 66 VA. L. REV. 167 (1980).
In this Forward to the Twenty-Fourth Annual Survey of Developments
in Virginia Law, Professor Bonnie examines the background of capital
sentencing, Virginia's capital punishment procedures, and the uses of
psychiatric testimony in capital cases. He also makes recommendations
in order to reduce the risks of unfairness and inconsistency.
Daniel Broderick, Note, Insanityof the Condemned,88 YALEL.J. 533 (1979).
This note asserts that previously approved state procedures for dealing
with the competency of condemned prisoners are inadequate in light of
recent Supreme Court decisions expanding procedural due process
protection. The author proposes a procedural framework for dealing with
the incompetency claims of condemned prisoners.
EDMUND G. (PAT) BROWN WITH DICK ADLER, PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE

MERCY (1989).
This book by former California governor Edmund "Pat" Brown,
discusses some of the fifty-nine death penalty cases that came before him
for clemency. Several of the cases involve insanity and mental illness.
The author discusses the nature of legal insanity and the problems with
psychiatric judgments.
Keith Alan Byers, Incompetency, Execution, and the Use of Antipsychotic
Drugs,47 ARK. L. REV. 361 (1994).
This article examines the issue of forced medication of condemned
inmates for the purposes of inducing competency to be executed. The
author notes the difficulty in defining competency and the varying
standards currently in use. He also looks at the phenomenon of postconviction insanity. He examines the rationales behind the prohibition
on executing the insane. He then looks at the use of antipsychotic drugs
to treat incompetency. After a discussion of their uses and side-effects,
he examines Washington v. Harper,494 U.S. 210 (1990), and its holding
concerning forcible medication of inmates. He applies this holding to the
insane condemned. He also looks at the ethical dilemma facing
psychiatrists involved in competency for execution decisions. He
discusses Perry v. Louisiana,498 U.S. 38 (1991), and concludes it is
difficult to argue forced medication is in the medical interest of an
incompetent condemned inmate. He urges the Supreme Court to resolve
this issue.
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CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRUEL AND UNUSUAL? (Carol D. Foster et al. eds.,

1992).
Part of the Information Series on Current Topics, this book gives an
overview of the capital punishment debate. It includes summaries of
landmark Supreme Court rulings, including those dealing with juveniles,
psychiatric testimony, the insane, and the mentally retarded. It also
reviews death penalty statutes, looking at the minimum age for
execution, and at the treatment of mental retardation. The book also
gives statistical information on executions, including breakdowns by age
and education, and an overview of capital punishment around the world.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (Hugo Adam Bedau and
Chester M. Pierce eds., 1976).
This work by noted abolitionist Hugo Bedau and Chester Pierce brings
together post- Furman v. Georgia,408 U.S. 238 (1972), social science
research on the death penalty in the United States. The book covers
research concerning the use of social science research in judicial
decisions, the administration of the death penalty in murder and rape
cases, public opinion, moral attitudes, deterrence, psychiatry, juries, and
death row. Chapters relevant to this bibliography are individually cited.
Christina B. Casals-Ariet and Harvey Bluestone, Competency to Be Executed,
in CORRECTIONAL PSYCHIATRY 121 (Richard Rosner and Ronnie B. Harmon
eds., 1989).
This chapter surveys the literature on competency for execution, looks
at death row stresses, and examines ethical dilemmas for psychiatric
professionals. The authors note that the effects of death row stresses will
lead to an increasing number of inmates who become insane on death
row, and thus raise the specter of competency to be executed issues.
They look briefly at Fordv. Wainwright,477 U.S. 399 (1986), and at the
ethical questions raised by this case. The views of several commentators
concerning competency to be executed problems are discussed. The
authors conclude by raising additional ethical questions and stating their
own position that psychiatrists should not participate in competency to
be executed evaluations or treatment. The chapter's appendix
summarizes some of the literature on this issue.
David P.S. Charitat, Note, Fraying the Hangman's Knot?: State v. Michael
Owen Perry, 54 LA. L. REV. 1701 (1994).
This note examines the Louisiana case of State v. Perry,610 So.2d 746
(La. 1992). In the course of the article, the author provides legal
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background on exempting the insane from execution and the involuntary
medication of inmates. After analyzing the Perry opinion, he concludes
the Louisiana Supreme Court erred by: failing to conduct a complete
legal analysis, failing to articulate a clear standard of competence for
execution, mistakenly accepting the artificial sanity rationale rejected in
the Supreme Court case of Washington v. Harper,494 U.S. 210 (1990),
failing to adequately explore the state's police power interest, and over
expanding privacy rights. He concludes by offering a proposed analysis
and statute for future Perrycases.
Jennifer L. Colyer, Comment, Mentally Ill Murderers:An OrwellianSolution
From a Southern State, 9 J. HUM. RTs. 541 (1992).
This article discusses Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1991), and the
issue of involuntarily medicating insane inmates in order to execute
them. The author concludes the Supreme Court is retreating from its
Fordv. Wainwright,477 U.S. 399 (1986), decision by denying certiorari
to inmates making insanity claims. She also concludes the order to
forcibly medicate Perry does not comply with the two recognized
justifications for forced medication of civilly committed patients. She
reviews federal cases on the forced medication of inmates and argues
these cases do not support forcible medication for the purposes of
execution. She also looks at Louisiana statutes dealing with the
medication of inmates and argues these do not support forcible
medication for the purposes of execution. She further argues neither
deterrence nor retribution is served by executing an artificially sane
defendant. She concludes forcibly medicating an inmate in order to
execute is unethical and undermines Ford.
Kevin E. Cox, Note, Execution of the Insane Criminal:Ford v. Wainwright,
41 S.W. L.J. 745 (1987).
After a brief historical overview on the execution of the insane and a
review of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the author analyzes Fordv.
Wainwright,477 U.S. 399 (1986). He concludes Ford merely affirms the
current state law but predicts the Supreme Court's due process analysis
of the Florida statute in the case will cause other states to reassess their
statutes.
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Kristen Wenstrup Crosby, Comment, State v. Perry: Louisiana'sCure-to-Kill
Scheme Forces Death-Row Inmates to Choose Between a Life Sentence of
UntreatedInsanity and Execution, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1193 (1993).
The author of this comment criticizes the State v. Perry, 610 So.2d 746
(La. 1992), decision for not adequately addressing the issues of forced
medication of incompetent inmates for execution purposes and the
appropriateness of artificial competence for execution. She begins by
looking at Supreme Court cases dealing with insanity and antipsycotic
drugs in prison settings. She then analyzes State v. Perry and criticizes
it for failing to address whether chemical competency is enough for
execution and for forcing inmates to choose between suffering insanity
and possibly facing execution if treated. The author argues chemical
competency is not sufficient for execution because it is temporary and
unpredictable. It masks symptoms but does not cure. Thus, she argues,
chemical competency cannot meet the reliability required for capital
cases.
Patrick A. Dawson and J. David Putnal, Note, Ford v. Wainwright: Eighth
Amendment Prohibits Execution of the Insane, 38 MERCER L. REv. 949
(1987).
After setting out a background of the reasons behind the prohibition
against executing the insane condemned, the authors analyze Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). They also raise a number of future
issues but do not attempt to address them.
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., rev. ed. 1967).
This anthology on capital punishment, edited by noted abolitionist Hugo
Bedau, collects works presenting information about the history and
implementation of the death penalty, arguments for and against the death
penalty, social science research on death penalty issues, and case
histories. This particular edition contains a section on juveniles and the
death penalty that is omitted in later editions.
THE DEATH PENALTY INAMERICA (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3d ed., 1982).
This later edition of Hugo Bedau's anthology on capital punishment
includes chapters on deterrence, public attitudes towards the death
penalty, error, constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment, and
arguments for and against the death penalty. In the beginning chapters,
Bedau discusses statutory mitigating circumstances such as diminished
capacity, mental disturbance, and the age of the offender.
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Bernard L. Diamond, Murder and the Death Penalty: A Case Report, in
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES

445 (Hugo Adam Bedau and

Chester M. Pierce eds., 1976).
In this chapter, the author examines the phenomenon wherein murderers
commit heinous crimes in order to invoke the death penalty in a state
assisted suicide. He discusses a California death penalty case to
illustrate this phenomenon. The prisoner had a history of psychiatric
problems and had attempted to obtain treatment. His treatment attempts
were unsuccessful so he committed several rape-murders in order to be
executed. The author asserts this phenomenon raises questions as to the
deterrent value of the death penalty.
Richard C. Dieter, InternationalPerspectivesOn the Death Penalty:A Costly
Isolation for the U.S., at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.orglinternational
report.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2000).
This report discusses the international trend toward the abolition of the
death penalty and the United States' position as a violator of human
rights. Among the issues discussed is the execution of the mentally ill.
The report discusses several individual cases to illustrate how difficult
a standard incompetency for execution is. It also discusses the costs of
the United States' failure to abide by international law regarding capital
cases.
George E. Dix, ParticipationBy Mental Health Professionals in Capital
MurderSentencing, 1 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHiATRY 283 (1978).
The author discusses psychiatric testimony in capital sentencing
procedures in Texas, Ohio, and Arizona. The author finds that a study
of the Texas experience reveals use of psychiatric testimony in the
aggravating rather than mitigating factors. In Ohio, he finds an
uncertainty regarding the significance of psychiatric testimony. In
Arizona, the author finds a tendency to view certain potentially
mitigating circumstances as irrelevant due to the labels psychiatrists use.
George E. Dix, PsychologicalAbnormality and CapitalSentencing, 7 INT'L
J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 249 (1984).
This article looks at the concept of diminished responsibility in capital
sentencing and the role of psychiatric testimony. The author looks at
state statutes which incorporate diminished responsibility as mitigating
factors, and the administration of those statutes. After looking at case
law, he concludes diminished responsibility findings are given little
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weight in deciding between life and death, and in some cases increase the
pressure to impose death.
Robert F. Drinan, The State and Insane Condemned Criminals, 12 JURIST 92
(1952).
The author examines Solesbee v. Balcom and concludes the Supreme
Court erroneously decided that a condemned person's sanity was
adequately addressed by the Georgia procedure. He agrees with Justice
Frankfurter's dissent that the issue of a condemned man's sanity must be
judicially protected.
Albert A. Ehrenzweig, A Psychoanalysisof the Insanity Plea - Clues to the
Problemsof CriminalResponsibility and Insanity in the Death Cell, 1 CRIM.
L. BULL., Nov. 1965, at 3.
The author looks at the problem of insanity and capital punishment. He
asserts the definition of insanity depends on its specific purpose, and the
problem of legal insanity is unresolved in regards to legal insanity as a
defense and the execution of the insane. He explores the purposes
behind punishment and concludes insanity cannot be uniformly defined
because punishment serves so many conflicting aims. He argues
exempting the insane from execution cannot be explained under the
reform and deterrence rationales. He finds the retributive purpose of
punishment to be made up of different facets, and each facet results in a
different attitude toward insane offenders. He suggests society should
either be truthful enough to abolish the insanity defense and execute sane
and insane alike, or abolish the death penalty.
Van W. Ellis, Note, Guilty But Mentally Ill and the Death Penalty:
Punishment Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying Nothing, 43 DuKE L.J. 87
(1993).
After examining the proportionality and penological justifications of the
Eighth Amendment, the author argues the death penalty's application
must be limited to defendants possessing sufficient culpability. He looks
at the tie between volitional impairment, culpability, and the death
penalty in juvenile and mentally retarded cases. He compares this to the
guilty but mentally ill and concludes that based on a culpability analysis,
those who are guilty but mentally ill should not be executed.
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Phoebe C. Ellsworth et al., The Death Qualified Jury and the Defense of
Insanity, 8 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 81 (1984).
This article presents the results of a study examining the tendency of
death-qualified jurors to convict defendants pleading insanity. The
subjects of the study consisted of thirty-five adults eligible for jury duty
in California. Subjects were placed in death-qualified and excludable
categories. Subjects who would have been excluded from juries in
capital cases were more likely than death-qualified subjects to vote for
a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. There was no significant
difference between subject groups, however, where the insanity defense
was based on a physical disorder versus a mental disorder. Deathqualified jurors were more suspicious of the insanity defense. The
authors argue attitudes toward criminal justice are more important than
general attitudes toward the mentally ill. They assert insane defendants
may suffer discrimination in capital cases because death-qualified jurors
are more skeptical of the insanity defense than those excluded because
of their opposition to the death penalty.
Anne S. Emanuel, Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdicts andthe Death Penalty:An
Eighth Amendment Analysis, 68 N.C. L. REv. 37 (1989).
The article begins with a history of the guilty but mentally ill verdict.
The author argues that a verdict of guilty but mentally ill contains a jury
finding of diminished responsibility. She then performs a proportionality
analysis pursuant to the Eighth Amendment. She asserts that because of
the jury's finding of diminished responsibility, the defendant is less
culpable than other adult offenders. She concludes that this lesser
culpability means the penological goals of retribution and deterrence are
not served by executing the guilty but mentally ill.
Jonathan L. Entin, Psychiatry, Insanity, and the Death Penalty: A Note on
Implementing Supreme Court Decisions,79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 218
(1988).
The article discusses the difficulty of implementing Fordv. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399 (1986). The author addresses the lack of a legal definition
of insanity, the ethical dilemmas facing psychiatrists involved in cases
relating to the insane condemned, the types of proceedings that might be
used in Fordcases, the burden the different types of proceedings might
impose, and the difficulty in justifying and explaining a rule against
executing the insane.
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Paul F. Enzinna and Jana L. Gill, Capital Punishmentand the Incompetent:
Procedures for Determining Competency to Be Executed After Ford v.
Wainwright, 41 FLA. L. REV. 115 (1989).
In this article the authors look at due process and Eighth Amendment
protections for competency procedures for condemned inmates. The
authors see the prisoner's life and liberty interests as outweighing the
state's interest in efficiency and flexibility for these proceedings. They
assert that vague competency standards, failure to provide adequate
examinations, or refusal to allow inmates to present testimony of their
own experts may render competency determinations unreliable under the
Eighth Amendment. They propose a comprehensive system of mental
health care for the condemned prisoners. Under their system, if a
prisoner met a heightened standard of incompetency, an adversarial
hearing would take place. The authors argue the hearing should be held
by a judge or jury and that condemned prisoners should be represented
by counsel. They assert states need to set substantive standards
regulating the psychiatric examinations.
G. Linn Evans, Note, Perry v. Louisiana: Can a State Treat an Incompetent
Prisonerto Ready Him ForExecution?, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L.
249 (1991).
This article looks at the issue of forcibly medicating insane inmates on
death row in order to make them competent for execution. The author
begins with a discussion of Perryv. Louisiana,498 U.S. 38 (1991), and
the legal history of the insane and the death penalty. Additionally, the
author examines Washington v. Harper,494 U.S. 210 (1990). The
author then applies the principles of Harperto Perry. The author argues
that without evidence Perry was a threat to himself or others, Louisiana's
police power interest does not qualify as a legitimate interest for forcible
medication. The author asserts that furthermore, there is no parens
patriaejustification for facilitating an incompetent's death. The note
concludes that forcibly medicating Perry in order to execute him is a
violation of Harper. The author also argues Perry should have been
decided under the Eighth Amendment. The note ends by proposing three
solutions to the ethical dilemma posed for psychiatrists in these cases.
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Charles Patrick Ewing, "Above All Do No Harm": The Role of Health and
Mental Health Professionals in the Capital Punishment Process, in
AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 461 (James R. Acker
et al. eds., 1998).
This chapter examines the ethical dilemmas health care professionals
face when they become involved in capital cases. The author focuses on
three areas: capital sentencing, competency to stand trial, and
assessment and restoration of competency for execution. He concludes
participation in competency to stand trial evaluations and treatment is
ethically permissible, provided the action is narrowly drawn to avoid
potential harm to the defendant. He finds testimony as to mitigating and
aggravating factors arguably unethical, and asserts that professionals
must take precautions to minimize the possibility of a death sentence. He
concludes participation in assessment and restoration of competency for
execution is unethical, as is any involvement in the actual execution.
Charles Patrick Ewing, Diagnosingand Treating "Insanity" On Death Row:
Legal and EthicalPerspectives, 5 BEHAv. Sa. & L. 175 (1987).
The author looks at the ethical dilemma in evaluating and treating death
row inmates. He examines the history and justifications behind the
prohibition on executing the insane.
He finds mental health
professionals cannot fulfill both the legal and ethical demands in these
cases. He argues the evaluation and treatment of the insane condemned
has the practical effect of authorizing the execution, which conflicts with
the ethical requirements to heal and relieve suffering. He concludes
psychiatric input is not essential to legal decisions concerning
competency to be executed. He suggests that if professionals refuse to
treat the insane condemned until their sentences are commuted to life, it
might push legislatures to exempt those inmates found insane from
execution. He urges a boycott and suggests professional organizations
prohibit their members from participating in these situations.
J.D. Feltham, The Common Law and the Execution of Insane Criminals, 4
Melbourne U.L. Rev. 434 (1964).
This article concerns itself with English common law and the case of The
Queen v. Tait, (1962) 108 CLR 620. The author argues the common law
rules giving the courts the power to grant ajudicial inquiry into the sanity
of a condemned prisoner and to reprieve him if he is insane are still
operative.
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George C. Grover, Comment, 23 S. CAL. L. REv. 246 (1950).
This comment discusses Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431 (1948). The author
debates whether due process or equal protection prohibit an ex parte
determination of return to sanity by an administrative officer. He
concludes the newly amended California statute, which provides a
judicial hearing for the finding of the hospital administrator, is
appropriate. He suggests additional amendment to the statute in order to
restore discretion to the warden and to provide a standard for determining
sanity.
H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1996).
This book discusses the anti-death penalty movement in America from
1972 to 1994. The author examines the efforts to develop a multi
organizational network to attack the death penalty. He discusses the
involvement and contributions of Amnesty International. Amnesty
International pushed for incremental attacks on the death penalty and
pursued studies revealing the lack of public support for executions of
those under eighteen, those with a history of mental illness, and the
mentally retarded. The book reports the success of legislation
prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded.

HERBERT

Mark Hansen, Insane Inmate Avoids Death Penalty, 79 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993,
at 32.
A report on the Louisiana Supreme Court decision in State v. Penry, 610
So.2d 746 (La. 1992). The Louisiana decision was the first to hold that
an incompetent condemned inmate could not be involuntarily medicated
in order to be put to death.
Roberta M. Harding, "Endgame": Competency and the Execution of
Condemned Inmates - A Proposal to Satisfy the Eighth Amendment's
ProhibitionAgainst the Infliction of Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 14 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 105 (1994).
After reviewing the history and justifications behind the prohibition on
executing the insane, the author explores the current typical competency
to execute statute. She criticizes this model, labeling it too simplistic and
asserting the lack of uniformity violates Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399 (1986), and the Eighth Amendment. She also asserts it does not
properly address the restoration of competency issue. She proposes an
alternative competency to execute plan. This plan finds a new term,
"severe mental impairment" to replace the inadequate terms of
"incompetence" and "insanity." She defines the term as, at a minimum,
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including organically caused losses of mental acuity, psychiatric based
losses, and mental retardation. She proposes requiring an examination
and assessment of the inmate's functional capability. She also addresses
the restoration of competency issue, arguing the prevailing position is
that mental impairment cannot be cured, therefore, a death sentence for
an inmate meeting her requirement of severe mental impairment should
be commuted to a life sentence. She concludes by rebutting perceived
problems with her proposed competency to execute plan.
Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. and David W. Louisell, Death, the State and the

Insane: Stay of Execution, 9 UCLA L. REV. 381 (1962).

The authors review the scope and purpose of the rule prohibiting the
execution of the insane and assert the most acceptable justification for
the rule is that it is unnecessary to execute an insane person. They then
explore the procedures for evaluating the claim of incompetence both at
common law and by the states. They discuss the test of insanity and
argue the appropriate test is whether the defendant's condition is such
that he or she would be subject to involuntary commitment under
ordinary circumstances. The authors examine the constitutional
requirements for a hearing and conclude by proposing a statute on the
issue.

Kirk Heilbrun, The Assessment of Competency for Execution: An Overview,

5 BEHAV. So. &L. 383 (1987).
This article examines some of the problems with evaluating an inmate's
competency to be executed.. The author looks at the justifications behind
the competency for execution requirement. He discusses the nature of
competency for execution and finds little consensus among the states.
He concludes that a standard for competency to be executed cannot be
developed until society clarifies what the justification is behind this
competency. He addresses the process for determining competency and
determines a hearing, representation by counsel, and the opportunity to
present evidence is required. He suggests unbiased examiners with
clinical-legal and clinical experience make the evaluation. He asserts
multiple contact with the patient is required, and looks at the problems
of informed consent and environment. He recommends a written report,
comprehensive enough to allow others to understand what the examiner
did and how he/she arrived at that conclusion. He notes the ethical issues
raised but does not attempt to resolve them.
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Kirk S. Heilbrun and Harry A. McClaren, Assessment of Competency for
Execution? A Guidefor Mental Health Professionals,16 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY L. 205 (1988).
This article discusses the issues of whether mental health professionals
should assess competency for execution and how such assessment should
be done. In discussing whether mental health professionals should
participate, the authors look at the arguments for and against
participation. They conclude individuals should reflect on their own
personal beliefs and consult with colleagues who have experienced these
assessments. As to the procedure, they assert professionals need to
inform the inmate of the purpose, procedures, and possible consequences
of an evaluation. They assert the setting must be private and distraction
free. They recommend looking at independent information on
functionality and history. They suggest meeting the patient several times
on different days. They urge full documentation in a written report.
They conclude by noting areas where further research would be helpful.
Kirk Heilbrun et al., The Debate on Treating Individuals Incompetent For
Execution, 149 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 596 (1992).
The authors address the ethical dilemma posed by treating insane
condemned inmates. They consider the three positions mental health
professionals take on treating the condemned incompetent, and find none
of the positions specific as to definition of treatment, the nature of the
disorders, and goals of treatment. They find three classes of disorders
that might render an inmate incompetent for execution. They identify
possible goals of treatment beyond the recovery of competence. The
authors discuss the arguments for and against treating the incompetent
condemned. They conclude a decision to treat should depend on the
nature of the treatment, goals of the treatment, standards of competency,
and determination of the inmate's ability to consent to treatment. They
find that where treatment involves things like psychotropic medicine
there is a compelling need for fully informed consent. They argue there
is an ethical demand, even if no legal one, for abstaining from
involuntary treatment of an incompetent condemned inmate.
ROGER HOOD, THE DEATH PENALTY A WORLD-WIDE PERSPECTIVE (1989).

This report to the United Nations Committee on Crime Prevention and
Control is based on a study of the death penalty. The report addresses
the observation of standards and safeguards guaranteeing the rights of
those facing the death penalty. The report finds twenty-six states had
minimum death penalty ages from twelve to seventeen or no minimum
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age at all, thus violating standards for juveniles. The report examines
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361 (1989). In addition to juvenile safeguards, the report
addresses the mentally incapacitated. It finds the federal government and
some states have modified the insanity defense, and three states have
abolished it. Twelve states have adopted a guilty but mentally ill verdict,
which the author believes precludes a death sentence. The report notes
the problem of death row inmates becoming mentally ill after trial and
the execution of mentally retarded offenders in the United States.
Nancy S. Horton, Comment, Restoration of Competency For Execution:
FuriosusSolo Furore Punitur,44 Sw. L.J. 1191 (1990).
This comment addresses the issue of forcible medication of an
incompetent condemned and concludes restoration of competency
violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The author examines
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in death penalty cases and also
looks at the history of the restoration of competency. She examines the
ethical and constitutional problems of restoring competency for
execution. She recommends states commute the death sentence of
incompetent prisoners on death row.
Steven J. Hupp, Note, Ford v. Wainwright, Statutory Changesand a New Test
For Sanity: You Can't Execute Me, I'm Crazy!, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 515
(1987).
The author begins by briefly considering the history of insanity and
execution and Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). He asserts
some states' existing procedures for determining the competency of the
condemned are no longer valid. He points out three areas that those
states need to address: the right to a hearing on sanity, the test of
insanity, and due process in the hearing. He proposes a threshold hearing
using three disinterested psychiatrists. The proposed test for insanity
would look at whether the inmate comprehends the physical finality of
death; understands the causal link between his crime and his execution;
and knows and understands his property, the nature of his acts, and his
family and friends. He proposes that counsel for the defense be able to
present any relevant evidence and be able to cross-examine and impeach
state psychiatrists. In his suggested procedure, the insanity issue would
be decided by a judge and not be open to appeal. The author then
analyzes the Ohio statute and proposes amendments.
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Stephen L. Ibm, Note, Ford v. Wainwright, The Eighth Amendment, Due
Process and Insanity on Death Row, 7 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 89 (1987).
This note looks at Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and the
procedures necessary to satisfy due process for a competency to be
executed hearing. The author concludes the Court correctly decided it
was unconstitutional to execute the insane. He discusses the
requirements of due process and applies these requirements to the
question of competency to be executed. He argues the mentally
incompetent prisoner must be appointed counsel near the execution date
in order for notice to be properly served and to give the inmate an
opportunity to be heard. He asserts the first hearing should be ajudicial
inquiry. Subsequent claims should be handled by a panel of psychiatrists
who interview the prisoner and submit written findings. Judicial review
should be available but substantial deference would be given to the initial
determination.
Rhonda K. Jenkins, Comment, FitTo Die: Drug-InducedCompetency For the
Purpose of Execution, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 149 (1995).
This article examines the issue of forcibly medicating insane inmates in
order to execute them. The author begins by looking at the justifications
for prohibiting execution of the insane and then looks at substantive and
procedural due process problems with this issue. She argues using
psychoactive drugs does not cure mental illness but only temporarily
relieves the symptoms and that artificial sanity is not sufficient for
execution. She asserts forced medication in a death penalty case
constitutes punishment not treatment and so falls under the Eighth
Amendment. She examines Perry v. Louisiana, 610 So.2d 746 (La.
1992), and concludes it was correctly decided. She argues the state must
commute a condemned inmate's sentence to life imprisonment in order
to remove the threat of execution and allow them to obtain needed
treatment.
Jay E. Kantor, Psychiatry in the Service of the CriminalPunishment System:
Some Conceptualand Ethical Issues, in 6 CORRECTIONAL PSYCHIATRY 169
(Richard Rosner and Ronnie B. Harmon eds., 1989).
This chapter discusses the dual agency ethical dilemma psychiatrists
working in the criminal justice system face. The author discusses the
psychiatrist-patient contract, the autonomy and prisoner-patient model,
and the multiple agency dilemmas involved in the evaluation and
treatment of prisoners. He examines the competency to be executed
issue and summarizes the various options psychiatrists in that position
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have. He asserts the goal of psychiatry to restore autonomy can be
consistent with inducing competency. He explores the rationales of
punishment to support this statement.
David L. Katz, Note, Perry v. Louisiana: Medical Ethics on Death Row - Is
JudicialIntervention Warranted?,4 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 707 (1991).
This note examines the issue of forced medication in order to induce
competency for execution. After a brief discussion of the justifications
behind the exemption of the insane from execution, the author looks at
Perry v. Louisiana,498 U.S. 38 (1991). He examines the ethical codes
for physicians and looks at how the courts have used these ethical codes.
He finds treatment applied solely for execution is a fundamental
violation of medical ethics, and concludes psychiatrists must never
prescribe treatment. He argues the Louisiana court in Perrywas ordering
physicians to violate their professional ethics, and he looks at whether
the Supreme Court should have given judicial support to medical ethics.
He asserts that the deference given to widely-recognized medical
principles, the recognition courts have given to these principles, and a
national and international consensus against physician participation in
executions, all indicate the Supreme Court should have expressly
prohibited forced medication by physicians to induce competency for
executions.
William D. Kenner, Competency On Death Row, 8 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY
253 (1986).
In this article the author compares the competency to be executed issue
with the competency to stand trial issue. He asserts that mental health
professionals can avoid entanglement with judging how insane an inmate
needs to be to avoid execution by giving the court a functional diagnosis
of the condemned inmate.
Ebrhim J. Kermani and Jay E. Kantor, Psychiatryand the Death Penalty:The
Landmark Supreme Court Cases and Their Ethical Implications For the
Profession,22 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 95 (1994).
The authors review the recent Supreme Court rulings of Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38
(1991); Washington v. Harper,494 U.S. 210 (1990); Riggins v. Nevada,
504 U.S. 127 (1992); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); and
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989); and conclude they exacerbated
current and created new ethical dilemmas in psychiatry. They discuss
ethical and clinical objections to restoring competency. They argue that
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it is difficult to justify forced restoration of competency in cases of
prisoners incompetent to be executed because there can be no inference
that the defendant would consent to therapy so he/she could be executed,
and such treatment cannot be thought of in the best interests of the
patient. They assert these arguments can only be overcome if one can be
convinced the defendant would have consented to treatment if competent
or if a compelling state interest overrides the patient's refusal. The
authors discuss the ongoing debate concerning mental maturity in
juveniles and the mentally retarded. They also discuss cases involving
psychiatric testimony on mitigating and aggravating factors, and victim
impact testimony. They conclude psychiatrists should be guided by their
personal beliefs on punishment, moral obligations, civic duty, and patient
rights when dealing with any of these issues.
Eric M. Kniskem, Does Ford v. Wainwright's Denial of Executions of the
InsaneProhibitthe State FromCarryingOut Its CriminalJusticeSystem?, 26
S.U. L. REV. 171 (1999).
This article examines Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and
Perry v. Louisiana,498 U.S. 38 (1991). The author looks at the issues
that have arisen from these two cases, particularly the issue of forcibly
medicating incompetent inmates in order to execute them. He proposes

three separate solutions to the problem of an inmate who has regained
sanity: commute the sentence to life without parole, have mandatory
counseling, or abolish the death penalty.

Dorean M. Koenig, Freedom or Death: Two Doors in the Criminal Justice
System (A Comparisonof the Insanity Defense and Capital Sentencing), 2
COOLEY L. REV. 341 (1984).
The author looks at the intersection between law and mental health
science and concludes the question of insanity has suffered as a result.
The author explores the evolution of the insanity defense. The author
argues the criminal justice system is based on theories of free will, while
the mental health professions are based on the theory of determinism.
The author asserts the result of trying to interface the two has expanded
the definition of insanity and led to a backlash against the defense due to
the release of dangerous criminals. The author finds the test of insanity
became the test for future dangerousness, thus the same test can lead to
freedom or to death.
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Paul J. Larkin, Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of the
Presently Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. REv. 765 (1980).
The author argues the Eighth Amendment forbids the execution of the
presently incompetent. He surveys the Supreme Court's treatment of
Gilmore-type cases and describes the Court's approach to capital
punishment under the Eighth Amendment. He concludes that in light of
Anglo-American common law history, contemporary statutes, and the
Court's own doctrines, execution of the incompetent would be cruel and
unusual punishment. He proposes a standard for present incompetency
and procedures for raising and resolving the issue.
Barry Latzer, Death Penalty Cases: Leading U.S. Supreme Court Cases on
Capital Punishment (1998).
This book contains excerpts of the Supreme Court cases on the death
penalty. It also contains a brief overview of the history of the Eighth
Amendment, capital laws and procedures, and the capital punishment
debate. The appendix contains facts and figures on murder and the death
penalty. Cases discussed that are relevant to this bibliography include
Stanfordv.Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Fordv. Wainwright,477 U.S.
399 (1986); and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989).
James S. Liebman and Michael J. Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing
Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Plate": Mental Disorder as a Mitigating
Factor,66 GEO. L.J. 757 (1978).
This article examines five Supreme Court decisions handed down on July
2, 1976: Gregg v. Georgia,428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffittv. Florida,428
U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North
Carolina,428 U.S. 280 (1976); and Roberts v. Louisiana,431 U.S. 633
(1976). The authors distill from these cases a doctrinal framework of the
Eighth Amendment. They assert a statute attempting to enumerate
exclusive mitigatory factors is unconstitutional and that a defendant has
a right to jury instructions on guided individualization. The authors
apply their doctrinal framework to the treatment of mental illness as a
mitigation and conclude a mentally disordered offender should receive
mitigatory consideration. In order to determine the degree of mitigation,
they propose a four-factor analysis. They apply this analysis to the
mentally retarded and the sociopath and conclude there is a compelling
case for reducing a death sentence for a mentally retarded offender.
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Dana Lowy, Note, Perry v. Louisiana: To Execute or Not to Execute a
Mentally Incompetent Convicted Criminal... That Remains the Question, 21
Sw. U. L. REv. 205 (1992).
This note examines Perry v. Louisiana,498 U.S. 38 (1991), and argues
that on remand, the Louisiana Supreme Court must vacate the death
sentence in order to properly apply the principles expressed in Ford v.
Wainwright,477 U.S. 399 (1986), and Washington v. Harper,494 U.S.
210 (1990). The author asserts Michael Perry has never been a threat to
himself or others, thus involuntarily medicating him in order to execute
him does not pass the Harpertest. She argues Perry's interests outweigh
the state's interest in seeing its criminal penalties enforced. She also
argues involuntarily medicating him to force competency for execution
would undermine the Fordv. Wainwright prohibition against executing
the insane. Furthermore, she finds it would violate medical ethics.
D' Andrea McMooian, Casenote, Perry v. Louisiana - Has the JudicialBranch
Overstepped Its Boundaries Into the Sacred Area of ConstitutionalRights?,
19 S.U. L. REV. 231 (1992).
This note discusses Perry v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 38 (1991), and
concludes the Louisiana Supreme Court violated the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments when it issued an order forcibly medicating an
insane condemned inmate so that he could be executed. The author
argues that involuntarily injecting Perry with psychotropic medication
that has potentially serious side effects violates the dignity of man
principle underlying the Eighth Amendment. The author asserts this
involuntary medication is not treatment, but rather punishment, and could
allow Louisiana to execute an insane man. The author argues
Louisiana's law concerning forced medication creates a liberty interest
protected by the Due Process clause.
Robert D. Miller, Evaluations of and Treatment to Competency to be
Executed: A National Survey and an Analysis, 16 J. Psychiatry & L. 67
(1988).
This article addresses the procedures for the determination of
competency and treatment of incompetent death row inmates. The author
conducted a national survey of attorney generals of states with capital
punishment. He concludes very few states have procedures to determine
competency that would pass the Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399
(1986), test. He found few states were aware of specific procedures
addressing the rights of incompetent inmates to refuse treatment. None
of the participants in the survey were sure whether state mental health
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professionals would be required to forcibly medicate incompetent
inmates. The author finds the preferred policy of mental health
professionals is commutation of death sentences, but since few states
provide for this, the author proposes the states permit treatment solely to
render the patient competent to make treatment decisions. Then the
competent inmate can decide whether or not to continue treatment.
Gordon L. Moore l, Comment, Ford v. Wainwright: A Code in the
Executioner'sSong, 72 IOWA L. REV. 1461 (1987).
The author analyzes Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and
proposes possible standards that the states should follow when dealing
with the issue of competency for execution. He finds Ford to be
imprecise and troubling for states because the Court gave little guidance
on what procedures for a competency hearing comply with due process
requirements. He proposes a solution where the fact finder is given a
single opinion based on a long-term, comprehensive examination by a
team of impartial psychiatrists. He suggests this examination should be
granted on an initial showing by the inmate governed by a sufficient
doubt standard. The results of the examination would be presented in a
court administered hearing.
Douglas Mossman, Assessing and Restoring Competency to Be Executed:
Should PsychiatristsParticipate?,5 BEHAV. Sci. & L. 397 (1987).
The author argues the evaluation and treatment of the insane condemned
does not violate ethical standards. He examines objections to psychiatric
participation in evaluating competency for execution and asserts they
over-extend the psychiatrist's role in the competency assessment. He
points out that psychiatrists can avoid the stigma of having imposed a
death sentence by their evaluation by insisting on procedural safeguards
and pronouncing findings that leave the ultimate determination to
execute to legal authorities. He argues the state's interest in carrying out
sentences and the loss of liberty that inmates experience may relieve the
usual requirements of informed consent. He also asserts that a finding
of incompetency to give consent may allow for an assessment of
competency to be executed. He examines traditional objections to
psychiatric treatment of the incompetent condemned and argues the oath
to preserve life has exceptions and that treatment of the condemned has
other purposes than just execution. He argues patient autonomy and the
right to refuse treatment may be less important where the state's interests
must also be considered. He asserts psychiatrists have a duty to return
patients to a condition where they can be punished and that these patients
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have implicitly consented to treatment by their choice to commit the
original crime.
Douglas Mossman, The Psychiatrist and Execution Competency: Fording
Murky Ethical Waters, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1 (1992).
This lengthy article looks at the ethical dilemmas facing psychiatrists
who evaluate and treat the incompetent condemned. The author
examines four types of arguments used by critics of psychiatric
involvement with the incompetent, condemned and asserts those
arguments are internally inconsistent. He argues that if one assumes
capital punishment is just and administrated fairly, psychiatrists no
longer face an ethical dilemma and may evaluate and treat the insane
condemned. He concludes this leaves psychiatry with two alternatives:
officially opposing the death penalty on moral grounds, or supporting
efforts to develop procedures for evaluating and treating the incompetent
condemned.
Sanford M. Pastroff, Note, Eighth Amendment - The ConstitutionalRights of
the Insane on Death Row, 77 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 844 (1986).

The author examines Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and
concludes that although the decision is a logical extension of Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, the Court erred in not providing minimal due
process guidelines and in not specifying the rationale for exempting the
insane from execution. He suggests that for raising a claim to insanity,
the state should allow a prisoner at least one hearing as a matter of right.
A full trial and a jury are not necessary, however, the prisoner must be
given an opportunity to be heard. He asserts an impartial authority
should hear the evidence. He suggests a high threshold requirement for
a hearing is necessary to avoid repeated claims of insanity. He argues
procedures determining restoration of competency must be more
stringent than those determining competency. He asserts the test for
insanity must be tailored to the purposes of the rule banning execution
of the insane. He finds the rule can only be justified by the belief that the
execution of an insane person has less retributive value than that of a
normal person.

RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT INAMERICA (199 1).

This book on the death penalty is divided into five parts. Part I gives an
overview of capital punishment. Part IIdiscusses the legal challenges to
the death penalty pre-Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and
discusses legal challenges and reform of the death penalty after Gregg v.
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Georgia. This part addresses mitigation evidence such as youth or
mental illness. This part also examines the execution of special groups
such as the mentally ill, mentally retarded, and juveniles. The Supreme
Court cases of Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Ford v.
Wainwright,477 U.S. 399 (1986); Thompson v. Oklahoma,487 U.S. 815
(1988); and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), are discussed.
Part III deals with racial discrimination and arbitrariness. Part IV
discusses arguments for and against the death penalty. Part V looks at
alternatives to capital punishment.
Michael Radelet and George W. Barnard, Ethics and the Psychiatric
Determination of Competency to be Executed, 14 BuLL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY L. 37 (1986).
The authors assert the rules prohibiting the execution of the mentally ill
are too vague, and this vagueness exacerbates the ethical dilemma of
physicians participating in the process. They urge change is needed and
conclude that until definitions and procedures are changed, a psychiatric
evaluation finding a person competent to be executed must be clearer,
more certain, and more comprehensive than a finding of incompetence.
Michael Radelet and George W. Barnard, Treating Those Found Incompetent
ForExecution: Ethical Chaos With Only One Solution, 16 BULL. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY L. 297 (1988).
This article addresses the ethical principles and dilemmas raised in
treating the insane condemned. The authors look at the dilemmas in the
context of the Gary Alvord case and report staff reactions to his
treatment. They conclude the ethical dilemma can only be resolved by
commuting the death sentences of the incompetent condemned to longterm imprisonment.
Carol Daugherty Rasnic, The U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court and
CapitalPunishment: Should the U.S.A. Put the Death Penalty to Death?,50
N. IR. LEGAL Q. 50 (1999).

This article gives an overview of important death penalty cases. In
particular it discusses Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), and

Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), concerning juveniles; Ford
v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), concerning the insane; and Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989); concerning the mentally retarded.
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Michael B. Ross, Don't Execute Mentally Disturbed Killers, 59 THE
HUMANIST, Jan. 1999, at 43.

This article by an author on death row urges new verdict forms to protect
the mentally ill from execution. He argues that although mental
disorders are to be considered mitigating factors, too many mentally ill
offenders are on death row. He asserts defendants face two problems
trying to prove diminished capacity: the skepticism of jurors and the
heinous nature of capital crimes. He argues the death penalty should be
limited to vicious, premeditated crimes; and that mentally ill defendants
do not perform such acts. He urges the introduction of "guilty but
mentally ill" and "guilty but mentally retarded" verdict forms and
prohibiting the death penalty for such verdicts. He advocates a sentence
of life without parole in those circumstances.

ROYAL COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, ROYAL COMMISSION ON
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1949-1953 REPORT (1953).

This report looks at capital punishment in Great Britain and whether it
should be changed or limited. In the course of answering this question,
the report looks at insanity and mental abnormality. The Commission
examines the law and practice in foreign countries, including the United
States. Great Britain later abolished the death penalty.

Rochelle Graff Salguero, Note, Medical Ethics and Competency to be
Executed, 96 YALE L.J. 167 (1986).
The author focuses on the ethical dilemma that exists when physicians
are called upon to treat the incompetent condemned. She analyzes the
state interests involved in using medical professionals to implement
competency to be executed statutes and proposes possible resolutions to
the ethical dilemma created by the state.
Douglas A. Sargent, Treating the Condemned to Death, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Dec. 1985, at 5.
This article addresses the dilemma facing psychiatrists when they deal
with condemned inmates. He argues psychiatrists betray the patient's
trust when they treat inmates so they can be executed. He asserts to do
so violates professional ethics. He finds the American Psychiatric
Association Council on Psychiatry's proposal to insulate therapists to be
"least-restrictive self-deception." He argues it is unethical to diagnose
competency to be executed and compares such state directed ethical
violations to Josef Mengele, the Nazi Angel of Death.
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THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW (1993).

This study analyzes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, international
humanitarian law, the European Convention of Human Rights, the
Geneva Convention, and other international law instruments. The author
discusses the emergence of customary norms prohibiting the death
penalty. He traces the development of the exclusion of certain categories
of persons from the death penalty. In particular, he looks at the exclusion
of juveniles and the insane. He predicts the prohibition of the death
penalty per se will be a customary international norm andjus cogens in
the future.

William A. Schabas, InternationalNorms on Execution of the Insane and the
Mentally Retarded, 4 CRIM. L.F. 95 (1993).
This article addresses the question of whether there is an international
norm prohibiting the execution of the insane and mentally retarded. The
author traces the history of this norm, from its beginnings in English
common law to the United Nation's list of safeguards concerning
implementation of the death penalty. He finds there is no evidence that
any state actually executes the insane, and thus concludes state practice
supports an international norm prohibiting execution of the insane. He
regards the U.N. safeguards as indicating the opiniojurisof its member
states. He cautions that procedural guarantees in capital cases dealing
with the insane must be rigorously applied. He concludes he cannot
affirmatively assert an international norm prohibiting execution of the
mentally ill as distinguished from the insane.
C. Robert Showalter, Psychiatric Participation in Capital Sentencing
Procedures:EthicalConsiderations,13 IN'LJ.L. &PSYCHIATRY 261 (1990).
This article discusses the role of psychiatrists in capital cases. The
author argues legal and judicial opinions cannot be used as ethical
guidelines for forensic psychiatrists. He examines the ethical problem
of informed consent and asserts that where jurisdictions do not insulate
clinical evaluation evidence from use against the defendant, the
psychiatrist should give adequate warning before any evaluation. He
also looks at the problem of improper interpretations of psychiatric
testimony and cites a Virginia law as a possible solution to this problem:
creating an explicit prohibition on using the defendant's statements in a
psychiatric evaluation as evidence of aggravation. He sees the need for
ethical guidelines and standards for forensic psychiatrists and asserts
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these guidelines should come from recognized theories and standards in
psychiatry.
C. Robert Showalter and Richard J. Bonnie, Psychiatrists and Capital
Sentencing: Risks and Responsibilitiesin a Unique Legal Setting, 12 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 159 (1984)..
This article discusses psychiatric evaluation and testimony in capital
sentencing situations. The authors look at mitigating mental abnormality
and future dangerousness. They warn psychiatrists must be sensitive to
the limits of their experience and appropriately qualify their opinions.
Robinette R. Shultz, Note, Loophole to Execution - Ford v. Wainwright, 20
CREIGHTON

L. REv. 867 (1987).

After discussing the history of death penalty jurisprudence, the author
examines Fordv. Wainwright,477 U.S. 399 (1986), and concludes the
Court erred in deciding the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution
of the insane. She argues the purposes of deterrence and retribution are
not served by banning execution of the insane. She asserts offenders will
claim insanity in order to escape execution. She looks at the facts of
Fordand asserts Ford never claimed to be insane until ten days before
his execution and that Ford had ample time to understand the nature and
purpose of his punishment. She argues offenders should not be allowed
an unlimited right to postpone executions. She concludes the Court
should have focused on the character of the offender and whether the
offender understood the nature of his punishment.

Mark A. Small and Randy K. Otto, Evaluations of Competency to Be

Executed, 18 CRIM. JUST. AND BEHAv. 146 (1991).

This article looks at the legal, clinical, and ethical aspects of a
competency to be executed evaluation. The authors summarize the
substantive and procedural requirements for competency evaluations
pursuant to Fordv.Wainwright,477 U.S. 399 (1986). They find no clear
ethical guidelines for mental health professionals evaluating the

competency of condemned inmates and assert the professional must
make his/her own decision. They provide basic guidelines regarding

disclosure and evaluation techniques. They caution mental health
professionals to avoid giving legal opinions as to the inmate's
competency to be executed.
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Mark A. Small, Comment, Performing "Competency to Be Executed"
Evaluations: A Psycholegal Analysis for Preventing the Execution of the
Insane, 67 NEB. L. REV. 718 (1989).
The author of this comment examines Fordv. Wainwright,477 U.S. 399
(1986), and looks at evaluation and treatment issues raised by the
decision. He argues that when states revise their statutes to comply with
Ford,they should take into account the administration of psychological
assessments of competency. Specifically, he asserts the need to examine
sources of bias, limits of confidentiality, competency to consent, Fifth
Amendment rights, and the reported findings. He also briefly looks at
treatment issues. He analyzes the Nebraska statute and finds it is
unconstitutional in light of Ford. To revise the Nebraska statute, he
suggests adopting language from mental health commitment statutes and
insanity defense statutes.
Charles E. Smith and Richard Reid Felix, Beyond Deterrence: A Study of
Defenses on Death Row, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 1986, at 55.
This study looks at the individual characteristics of thirty-four death row
inmates. The study looks at demographic information, offense
information, mental status, interpersonal relationships, and inmate
defenses.
George F. Soloman, Capital Punishment as Suicide and as Murder, in
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 432 (Hugo Adam Bedau and
Chester M. Pierce eds., 1976).
The author discusses the phenomenon of capital punishment and deathseeking behavior. He first discusses learned violence and the process
wherein society adopts murder as a problem-solving mechanism, thereby
encouraging some murderers to do likewise. He relates the case histories
of two murderers who killed in a conscious attempt to invoke the death
penalty and commit state-assisted suicide. He argues both society and
individuals must learn better problem-solving methods.
Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A Continuing Source of Aggravation: The
Improper ConsiderationofMitigating Factorsin Death PenaltySentencing,

41 HASTINGS L.J. 409 (1990).

The author examines the phenomenon of sentencers improperly
considering mitigating factors, such as mental illness, as aggravating
factors. He looks at death penalty cases and distills two principles that
are required in death penalty schemes: individualization and guidance.
He argues Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 410 (1982), provides means to
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challenge death penalty schemes that allow mislabeling of mitigating
factors. He finds modem death penalty statutes unconstitutional because
they fail to guide the jury in understanding and applying mitigating
factors; permit and encourage improper aggravating circumstances to be
considered; permit the use of nonstatutory aggravating factors; and
violate Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), by allowing mitigating
factors to be weighed as aggravating factors rather than independent
mitigating weight. He proposes solutions to this problem, suggesting
mandatory jury instructions that: (1) inform the jury of the penological
justifications for capital punishment; (2) define aggravating and
mitigating circumstances; and (3) address each mitigating factor offered
by the defendant.
G. Richard Strafer, Volunteering ForExecution: Competency, Voluntariness
and the Propriety of Third Party Intervention, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
860 (1983).
The author criticizes the courts for their cursory response to condemned
inmates who waive appeals to execution. He explores several cases and
argues that individuals who volunteer for execution suffer from suicidal
impulses and suffer from the brutal and dehumanizing conditions on
death row. He asserts there must be a comprehensive inquiry into the
voluntariness of the waiver, and the inquiry must take into account the
nature of the death decision and the coercive conditions of death row.
He addresses arguments about the inmate's "right to die" and discusses
the rights of third parties to intervene in such situations.
Shannon S. Sullivan, Case Note, Ford v. Wainwright: States CannotExecute
the Insane - But How Is Insanity Determined?,20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 549
(1987).
The author examines Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), and
concludes the Court correctly decided that the Eighth Amendment
prohibited the execution of the insane and that the Florida procedures to
determine competency were inadequate. The author criticizes the Court
for not providing minimum due process standards for competency
determinations. She asserts the Court should have defined the threshold
showing of insanity and foresees disparate treatment of insane prisoners
as a result. She argues the Court should have held that a neutral party
must appoint a panel of psychiatrists to examine the defendant, and
concludes states will interpret this silence as allowing biased examiners.
Finally, she argues the Court should have held that the prisoner has a
right to raise the initial insanity claim.
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The Supreme Court, 1985 Term, Leading Case, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100
(1986).
As part of this review of Supreme Court decisions, the ruling of Fordv.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), is discussed. The article finds the
Supreme Court's divisiveness and vagueness concerning adequate
procedures for determining the sanity of a condemned prisoner will lead
to more litigation and greater disparity in state policies.
WILLIAM TALLACK, HUMANITY AND HUMANITARIANISM (1871).

This book looks at the prison systems of Great Britain and the United
States. While much of the information and ideas are dated, the section
on insanity and capital punishment discusses issues that are still
problematic today. For example, the author examines the process for
determining insanity and what kinds of experts should be involved. He
also states it is unjust to execute the insane and looks at the connection
between executions and increased murders.

Task Force on the Role of Psychiatry in the Sentencing Process, American
Psychiatric Association, Psychiatry in the Sentencing Process, in ISSUES IN
FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 181 (1984).
This report looks at psychiatric participation in the sentencing process.
The report notes the increasing role of psychiatrists in this process due
to the individualization requirement of capital sentences. The task force
states psychiatrists can participate in capital trials and should make a
good faith effort to conduct thorough examinations while adhering to an
individual-centered orientation. The task force asserts psychiatrists
should rely on the doctrine of informed consent and suggests guidelines
concerning what form the examination should take, the scope of the
examination, what should be done with inmates incompetent to give
consent, the form a report on an evaluation should take, statements on
limitations of expertise, testimony on ultimate issues, and legal issues
that might come up.
Jonathan Taylor, Note, 9 U. ARK. LrrLE ROCK L. REV. 385 (1986-1987).
This note discusses the historic ban on executing the insane and looks at
death penalty jurisprudence. The author examines Fordv. Wainwright,
477 U.S. 399 (1986), and finds the decision significant because it creates
a new constitutional right. He notes Ford v. Wainwright is part of a
movement by the Court to restrict the death penalty.
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Ptolemy H. Taylor, Comment, Execution of the "Artificially Competent":
Cruel and Unusual?, 66 TULANE L. REV. 1045 (1992).
The author addresses the issue of forced medication of condemned
insane inmates in order to execute them. After looking at Eighth
Amendmentjurisprudence, the author states Fordv. Wainwright'sfailure
to define competency makes it unclear if drug-induced competency is
sufficient or if any conditions of reliability or predictability of
competency are required. He looks at Perryv. Louisiana,498 U.S. 38
(1991) and Washington v. Harper,494 U.S. 210 (1990), and concludes
that under the Due Process Clause, the state arguably must be allowed to
forcibly medicate against an incompetent prisoner's will because it
cannot otherwise carry out the sentence of death. He also concludes that
forcibly medicating death row inmates to induce competency is an
attempt to circumvent the Eighth Amendment prohibition against
executing the insane.

University of Alaska Anchorage Justice Center, Focus On the Death Penalty,
at http://www.uaa.alaska.edu/just/death/issues.html (last visited Oct. 1,2000).
This Web site attempts to provide links to resources from both sides of
the death penalty debate. This particular area of the site addresses
specific issues. In addition to information on deterrence, retribution and
justice for murder victims, the innocent, limiting appeals and habeas
corpus reform, costs of the death penalty, alternative sentencing, fairness,
moratorium, cruel and unusual punishment, and women, the site provides
links to statistical information and cases concerning juveniles, the
mentally retarded, and the mentally ill.
Donald H. Wallace, Incompetency for Execution: The Supreme Court
Challenges the Ethical Standards of the Mental Health Professions, 8 J.
LEGAL MED. 265 (1987).
The author identifies and discusses ethical issues raised by Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). He finds a conflict with the healing
ethic when an opinion of competency may enable the state to take a life.
He analogizes the treatment of a condemned incompetent inmate to lethal

injection. He compares a condemned inmate's right to refuse treatment
to civil commitment and competency to stand trial. He looks at
arguments supporting professional involvement in evaluating and treating

incompetence for execution purposes and concludes they inject

hypocrisy into the debate because participation by evaluation and

treatment creates the impression of moral sanction for capital
punishment.

He suggests that professional organizations should
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explicitly label involvement in evaluation and treatment of the
incompetent condemned as unethical and subject to disciplinary action.
He proposes several solutions to the ethical dilemma, including refusal
of treatment and the appointment of adversary mental health
professionals.
Donald H. Wallace, The Need to Commute the Death Sentence: Competency
for Execution and Ethical Dilemmas for Mental Health Professionals, 15
INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 317 (1992).
The author looks at post-Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986),
decisions of courts and explores the guidance these decisions give mental
health professionals involved in assessing and treating insane condemned
inmates. The article looks at the gaps and ambiguities left by Fordand
at attempts by lower courts to clarify and fill those gaps. The author then
looks to ethical issues involving the treatment of incompetent condemned
inmates. He finds the actions of the Supreme Court in Johnson v.
Cabana, 481 U.S.1061 (1987), and Lowenfleld v. Butler, 485 U.S. 995
(1988), undermine Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986). He
proposes two solutions to the ethical dilemmas posed by the insane
condemned. One solution is to amend ethical standards. The other is to
commute the sentence of the incompetent insane to life.
Barbara A. Ward, Competency for Execution: Problems in Law and
Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 35 (1986).
The author discusses psychiatric participation in determining competency
and treating incompetent condemned patients. She examines the ethical
dilemma facing psychiatrists who have a duty to treat the mentally ill but
whose treatment may lead to an execution.
Louis Jolyon West, PsychiatricReflections on the Death Penalty,in CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT INTHE UNITED STATES 419 (Hugo Adam Bedau and Chester M.
Pierce eds., 1976).
The author asserts the death penalty should be abolished because capital
punishment is outdated, immoral, wasteful, cruel, brutal, unfair,
irrevocable, obstructive, and dangerous. She discusses the ethical
dilemmas with which the death penalty confronts psychiatrists. She finds
physicians, sworn to preserve life, are placed in a position where inmates
are executed based on their testimony. She discusses the problem of
death row conditions causing psychiatric deterioration and the resulting
problem of the mentally ill condemned inmate. She argues capital
punishment breeds violence, particularly in those with suicidal urges.
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She illustrates her argument with cases of death row inmates who
murdered so that the state would put them to death. She urges the
medical profession to declare any physician participation in an execution
unethical.
Lawrence T. White, JurorDecision Making in the CapitalPenalty Trial, 11
L. & HUM. BEHAV. 113 (1987).
The author reports the results of an exploratory study conducted to
examine the death penalty decision process and to assess the
effectiveness of several defense strategies. The defense strategies tested
were: anti-capital punishment defense, social history defense, mental
illness defense, and no defense. The study finds jurors exposed to the
anti-capital punishment defense were the least punitive while jurors
exposed to the mental illness defense were the most punitive. The other
defense results were not significantly different from each other. The
author hypothesizes the mental illness defense was ineffective due to
juror feelings that mental illness is no excuse, that the defendant is
faking, and that the defendant should have gotten help for his problems.
The author finds these results consistent with other studies.
Lawrence T. White, The Mental Illness Defense in the Capital Penalty
Hearing,5 BEHAV. So. & L. 411 (1987).
This article looks at the effectiveness of the mental illness defense in
capital trials. The author looks at three studies and finds that in all of
them the mentally ill defense was ineffective. One study even found the
mentally ill defense was less effective than no defense at all. The author
looks at studies of insanity defense acquittals in an attempt to determine
what factors are associated with a successful mentally ill defense. He
finds the defense is more likely to be successful if psychiatrists
recommend it, if the defendant is diagnosed with a psychosis, if the
defendant has a history of psychiatric treatment or hospitalization, and
if there is objective evidence of psychopathology. He also finds the
defense more likely to succeed if the defendant is female or if the jury
contains mostly women. He finds jurors more likely to impose a death
sentence if they feel the defendant is going to be dangerous in the future.
The author points out that death-qualified jurors tend to be crime control
oriented and suspicious of psychological excuses for criminal acts.
WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY INTHE EIGHTIES (1987).

In this book, the author explores plea bargaining, the penalty trial,
discrimination, defendants who choose execution, and death-qualified
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juries. In his discussion of the penalty trial, the author looks at the role
of mental health professionals and mitigating evidence. In his discussion
on defendants who choose to waive appeals and be executed, he looks at
the issues of patient autonomy and competency. He argues that the issue
of competency should focus on whether the defendant has the ability to
knowingly and voluntarily choose between life and death. He explores
the reasons defendants might choose execution and notes the conditions
on death row and the urge for self-destruction. He links this
phenomenon to the role of deterrence and suggests that the death penalty
may be a less effective deterrent than life imprisonment.
WELSH S. WHITE, LIFE IN THE BALANCE: PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN
CAPITAL CASES (1984).

This book looks at procedural issues involved in death penalty cases.
The author looks at voir dire and death-qualified jurors. He discusses
disproportionality and the death penalty. He examines police trickery in
inducing confessions and Fifth Amendment concerns with psychiatric
evaluations. In his discussion of Fifth Amendment concerns and
psychiatric evaluations, he examines Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454
(1981). There the Supreme Court held that under the circumstances, the
defendant was entitled to Miranda warnings before a psychiatric
evaluation and that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel
was also violated. The author discusses the implication of this holding
to mentally ill defendants in capital cases. He analyzes the waiver by
offer of psychiatric evidence doctrine and asserts safeguards are needed
to limit the doctrine's effects. He suggests prohibiting the examiner from
testifying for the government, bifurcating the issues of insanity and guilt,
providing an attorney during examination, and restricting the scope of the

examination or postponing the examination until after the guilt phase is
over.

Welsh S. White, The Psychiatric Examination and the Fifth Amendment
Privilege in CapitalCases, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 943 (1983).
The article analyzes the "waiver by offer of psychiatric testimony"
doctrine and examines its application. The author closes by suggesting
safeguards to minimize the possibility the prosecution will use evidence
derived from a psychiatric examination in an unauthorized manner.
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Welsh S. White, Waiver and the Death Penalty: The Implications of Estelle
v. Smith, 72 J. C0M. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1522 (1981).
This article addresses waiver and Sixth Amendment issues involved in
psychiatric examinations in light of Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454
(1981). The author argues that the Supreme Court in Estelle equated the
psychiatric examination of the defendant with a custodial police
interrogation. He speculates familiar Miranda warnings before a
psychiatric examination may not be enough in a capital case, and that the
state may need to specifically warn the defendant that a jury could use
statements made in the psychiatric examination to sentence a defendant
to death. He also asserts Estelle redefined the right to an attorney when
it recognized a defendant's right to an attorney in deciding whether to
submit to a psychiatric exam.
III. MENTALLY RETARDED
A. SUPREME COURT CASE

Penry v. Lynaugh, 491 U.S. 302 (1989).
The defendant, Johnny Paul Penry, was mildly retarded, with the mental
age of a six-and-a-half-year-old. He filed for habeas corpus relief. After
dealing with a retroactivity issue, the Court addressed whether the
sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because the jury could not
adequately consider all of the mitigating evidence, and whether it was
cruel and unusual punishment to execute a mentally retarded offender.
The majority, made up of Justices O'Connor, Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens, found the jury was not able to adequately
consider all of the mitigating evidence presented due to the nature of the
Texas death penalty statute and the lack of curing instructions to the jury.
The majority, made up of Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Rehnquist, White,
and Kennedy, applied the evolving standards of decency test and found
there was no national consensus that executing the mentally retarded
offended the evolving standards of decency. Justice O'Connor further
held executing the mentally retarded does not violate the proportionality
requirement.
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B. BOOKS, ARTICLES, AND WEB SITES

A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS COMM., ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL
HEALTH STANDARDS (1989).

The American Bar Association Criminal Justice Standards Committee
developed ninety-six standards for dealing with the mentally
disadvantaged in the criminal justice system. The standards address
post-arrest obligations, pretrial evaluations, expert testimony, disclosures
from pretrial mental evaluations, competence to stand trial, postconviction determinations of competency, stays of execution, and
restoration of competency. The standards also discuss competency and
confessions and nonresponsibility for crime. The standards look at the
sentencing of mentally ill and mentally retarded offenders. They discuss
treatment, admissibility of pretrial assessments, and the right to refuse
treatment.

AMERICA' S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (James R. Acker et al.

eds., 1998).
This book looks at the experiment of capital punishment post-Furman v.
Georgia,408 U.S. 238 (1972), and discusses its failures. The chapters,
which are written by different authors, examine public opinion, law,
politics, deterrence, incapacitation and future dangerousness, women,
children, the mentally retarded, the innocent, incompetent counsel, deathqualified juries, mitigation, discrimination, habeas corpus, cost of the
death penalty, physician involvement, families of victims and offenders,
life on death row, clemency, and executions. Chapters relevant to this
bibliography hive been individually cited.
Amnesty International, Amnesty International Website Against the Death
Penalty,at http://www.web.amnesty.org/rmp/dplibrary.nsf/index (last visited
Oct. 1, 2000).
This site contains extensive substantive information concerning the death
penalty. Amnesty International reports on the death penalty are available
in their Web site library going back to 1996. These reports cover many
death penalty issues, including those concerning the mentally ill,
mentally retarded, and juveniles.
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AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, Al INDEX: AMR 51/195/99, UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA BEYOND REASON: THE EXECUTION OF JOHN PAUL PENRY, Dec.

1999, at 1.

This report discusses Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and the
results of the second trial on remand. The report condemns the execution
of the mentally retarded and urges Governor Bush to stop the execution.

Charles-Edward Anderson, Low-IQMurderers,75 A.B.A. J., Oct. 1989, at 26.
This article discusses state treatment of mentally retarded defendants in
capital cases in the wake of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989).
J. Vincent Aprile II, Executing the Mentally Retarded,CRIM. J., Spring 1994,
at 38.
This article looks at post-Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989),
legislation. The author notes that since Penry, eight states have enacted
a prohibition against executing the mentally retarded. He argues this
dramatic increase in the number of states prohibiting execution of the
mentally retarded provides ammunition to mount another constitutional
challenge. He urges each state to take a new look at whether the death
penalty is appropriate for the mentally retarded.
Philip C. Berg, Recent Developments, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 415
(1990).
This article reviews Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The author asserts that
critics of the decisions have an incomplete understanding of the Supreme
Court's holdings. He asserts the debate in Penry and Stanford is not
focused on the culpability ofjuvenile and mentally retarded offenders but
is on federalism and the role of the Court. He argues a case-by-case
analysis is appropriate and that principles of federalism dictate this
analysis is a state role. He concludes this federalism is more appropriate
than a bright line federal rule prohibiting executions ofjuveniles and the
mentally retarded.
Mary D. Bicknell, Note, ConstitutionalLaw: The Eighth Amendment Does
Not Prohibitthe Execution of Mentally Retarded Convicts, 43 OKLA. L. REV.
357 (1990).
The author begins her note by discussing the definition and classification
of mental retardation, the problems of the mentally retarded in the
defense process, and prior significant Eighth Amendment case law. The
main focus of the note is the examination of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
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392 (1989). As part of her analysis, she argues the Supreme Court does
not properly understand the defect of retardation. She urges state
legislatures to follow the Penrydissent and restrict the imposition of the
death penalty on the mentally retarded. She suggests the states
incorporate an instruction listing mental retardation as a mitigating
factor, or establish a bright line rule prohibiting the execution of those
with certain low I.Q. levels.
Jamie Marie Billotte, Note, Is It Justified? - The Death Penalty and Mental
Retardation,8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 333 (1994).
The author examines the six standard purposes of punishment and
discusses their application to the execution of the mentally retarded. She
argues four of the six purposes cannot justify capital punishment at all,
let alone for the mentally retarded. She rejects the remaining two
purposes of deterrence and retribution because the mentally retarded do
not have the same mental, emotional, and moral culpability as other adult
offenders do. She finds the execution of the mentally retarded to be
unacceptable.
Jonathan L. Bing, Protecting the Mentally Retarded From Capital
Punishment:State Efforts Since Penry andRecommendations Forthe Future,
22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59 (1996).
After giving background information on characteristics and definitions
of the mentally retarded, the author looks at the rationales for executing
the mentally retarded and concludes neither retribution nor deterrence
justifies their execution. He points out the barriers facing the mentally
retarded in the criminal justice system and concludes these barriers
increase the likelihood a mentally retarded defendant will be found
guilty. He rebuts the arguments that a ban on the execution of the
mentally retarded would lead to false claims or that such protection
would undercut the their independence. He examines Penryv. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 392 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); and
Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); and argues their national
consensus methodology is flawed. After analyzing the effect of new
Supreme Court members he concludes the Penry decision would likely
be affirmed. After examining successful and unsuccessful state
legislation banning the execution of the mentally retarded, he proposes
a model law.
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John Blume and David Bruck, Sentencing the Mentally Retardedto Death:An
Eighth Amendment Analysis, 41 ARK. L. REV. 725 (1988).
In this article, the authors contend mentally retarded offenders may never
constitutionally be put to death because death in these cases is an
excessive punishment serving no penological goal. The authors suggest
a legal presumption in favor of life once mental retardation has been
established.
Deon E. Brock, Assessing the Impact of Penry v. Lynaugh (1998)
(unpublished PhD dissertation, Sam Houston State University) (on file with
Sam Houston State University library).
This dissertation looks at post-Penrylegislation and its impact on Texas
cases. The author first examines death penalty jurisprudence, Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and the resulting Texas statute. The
author conducted a study of post-Penry cases. He finds the new
legislation has had no impact on consideration of mitigating evidence.
Defendants abused as children or mentally ill were more likely to receive
the death penalty.
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRUEL AND UNUSUAL?

(Carol D. Foster et al. eds.,

1992).
Part of the Information Series on Current Topics, this book gives an
overview of the capital punishment debate. It includes summaries of
landmark Supreme Court rulings, including those dealing with juveniles,
psychiatric testimony, the insane, and the mentally retarded. It also
reviews death penalty statutes, looking at the minimum age for
execution, and at the treatment of mental retardation. The book also
gives statistical information on executions, including breakdowns by age
and education, and an overview of capital punishment around the world.

J. Dwight Carmichael, Note, Penry v. Lynaugh: Texas Death Penalty
Procedure Unconstitutionally PrecludesJury Considerationof Mitigating
Evidence, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 347 (1990).
After giving a background on Supreme Court capital punishment rulings,
the author examines the holding in Peny v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392
(1989), and looks at its effect on the Texas death penalty. He concludes
the present statute is too flawed to be properly applied and asserts Texas
must amend or replace the statute. He recommends either adding a
fourth special issue addressing mitigating circumstances or replacing the
statute with one instructing the sentencer to weigh mitigating and
aggravating factors.
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Sherri Ann Carver, Note, Retribution - A JustificationFor the Execution of
Mentally Retarded and Juvenile Murderers, 16 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 155
(1991).
The author of this note looks at Penryv. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989),
and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and concludes these
cases were correctly decided in light of Eighth Amendmentjurisprudence
and the retributive theory of jurisprudence. After analyzing the cases,
she sets forth the general arguments against the death penalty and rebuts
them. She discusses the deterrence and retributive punishment theories
and applies these theories to the circumstances in Penry and Stanford.
She asserts both defendants were capable of distinguishing right from
wrong and evaluating various courses of action because they both killed
to escape detection. She argues in both casesthe sentencer is always free
to reject the death penalty if the juvenile or mentally retarded offender
is not sufficiently culpable.
Peter K.M. Chan, Note, Eighth Amendment - The Death Penalty and the
Mentally Retarded Criminal:Fairness,Culpability,and Death,80 J CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1211 (1990).
This note examines Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989). The author
concludes the Court correctly held the Texas statute was not per se
unconstitutional but that the Texas special issues did not allow the jury
to consider and give effect to all the relevant mitigating evidence. He
argues the Court erred in holding that capital punishment for a mentally
retarded offender is not cruel and unusual punishment. He asserts it
violates the proportionality test.
V. Stephen Cohen, Comment, Exempting the Mentally Retarded From the
Death Penalty: A Comment on Florida'sProposedLegislation, 19 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 457 (1991).
The author discusses Florida's attempt to pass legislation banning the
execution of mentally retarded offenders. He begins with a discussion
of the history and treatment of the mentally retarded. He then gives an
overview of death penalty jurisprudence. He traces the legislative
response to Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and urges Florida to
pass legislation prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded offenders.
He argues public opinion polls show Florida citizens oppose the
execution of the mentally retarded. He asserts neither retribution nor
deterrence support the death penalty for the mentally retarded due to the
debilitating characteristics of their condition. Finally, he points out the
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particular problems the mentally retarded face in the criminal justice
system and why they need special protection in capital cases.
Christopher S. Cook, Note, The Death Penalty and Mentally Retarded
Criminal Defendants: A Re-examination in Light of Penry v. Lynaugh, 19
CAP. U. L. REv. 869 (1990).
After a discussion of mental retardation and of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 392 (1989), the author concludes treating mental retardation as a
mitigating factor does not protect the mentally retarded defendant. He
argues mentally retarded defendants are unable to form the necessary
culpability to justify the death penalty. He compares the mentally
retarded to the mentally ill. He argues the execution of the mentally
retarded is not supported by the penological goals of deterrence or
retribution. He asserts instructions directing juries to consider mental
retardation as a mitigating factor do not protect mentally retarded
offenders because juries often treat it as an aggravating factor. He
proposes a presumption of life imprisonment rather than the death
penalty. He also proposes a presumption that a mentally retarded
offender is not competent to understand the nature of the charges against
him/her or able to adequately assist in his/her defense.
Thomas Criswell IV, Note, Death Penalty: Rios Grande: The Texas Courtof
CriminalAppeals Examines Mental Retardation as a Mitigating Factor in
Rios v. Texas, 47 OKLA. L. REv. 373 (1994).
This note examines the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decision in Rios
v. Texas, 846 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). The author finds the
Rios opinion requires more weight to be given to mitigating evidence of
mental retardation than is required under Penryv. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392
(1989), but criticizes the court for its confusing opinion. He argues the
Rios court should have explicitly stated that a separate question
concerning the defendant's mental retardation must be given to a jury.
After looking at how other states deal with mental retardation and the
death penalty, he concludes there is a growing movement to ban the
execution of the mentally retarded. He predicts the Supreme Court will
have a new opportunity to redetermine the evolving standards of decency
and prohibit the execution of the mentally retarded.
Donald E. d'Entremont, Case Comment, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 221 (1990).
In this examination of Penryv. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), the author
concludes the Supreme Court expanded the discretion of the sentencer
in such a way as to re-establish the arbitrary and capricious imposition
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of the death penalty. The author predicts this will lead to further
litigation.
David A. Davis, Executing the Mentally Retarded: The Status of FloridaLaw,
Fla. B.J., Feb. 1991, at 12.
This article takes a look at the Florida approach to sentencing the
mentally retarded in capital cases. The author begins by looking at the
characteristics of mental retardation and at the Supreme Court's
treatment of the mentally retarded in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392
(1989). After examining Florida's approach, he concludes that Florida
is increasingly willing to consider the mentally retarded defendant as
different than a normal adult defendant. He proposes that the state erect
significant hurdles to the execution of the mentally retarded instead of a
flat prohibition on such executions, and provides an example of how
such a scheme could work.

THE DEATH PENALTY INAMERICA (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., rev. ed. 1967).

This anthology on capital punishment, edited by noted abolitionist Hugo
Bedau, collects works presenting information about the history and
implementation of the death penalty, arguments for and against the death
penalty, social science research on death penalty issues, and case
histories.

THE DEATH PENALTY INAMERICA

(Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 3d ed., 1982).

This later edition of Hugo Bedau's anthology on capital punishment
includes chapters on deterrence, public attitudes towards the death
penalty, error, constitutionality under the Eighth Amendment, and
arguments for and against the death penalty. In the beginning chapters,
Bedau discusses statutory mitigating circumstances such as diminished
capacity, mental disturbance, and the age of the offender.

Death Penalty Information Center at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/ (last
visited Oct. 1, 2000).
This anti-death penalty site contains extensive information on the death
penalty. It addresses special topics, among which are juveniles and the
mentally retarded. The pages include statistics on the mentally retarded
on death row and the mentally retarded executed.
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Deborah W. Denno, Testing Penry and Its Progeny, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1
(1994).
This article looks at post-Penry litigation in Texas. The author argues
there is no support for the Texas Court's restrictive interpretation of the
kind of mitigating evidence that can provide Penry relief. She also
argues Penry's concept of mitigation and aggravation rests upon false
assumptions on the relationship between crime and future dangerousness.
She uses the Biosocial Study to support her arguments. She asserts
assumptions favoring internal mitigating factors, such as mental
retardation, over external factors, such as lead poisoning, are
inappropriate.
Rebecca Dick-Hurwitz, Comment, Penry v. Lynaugh: The Supreme Court
Deals a FatalBlow to Mentally Retarded CapitalDefendants, 51 U. PIrr. L.
REv. 699 (1990).
In this comment, the author examines Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392
(1989), and concludes the Supreme Court erred in not prohibiting the
execution of mentally retarded defendants. In reaching this conclusion,
she gives an overview of death penalty jurisprudence and then analyzes
Penry. She criticizes the Court for failing to understand mental
retardation. She argues the Court confused mental retardation and
insanity and inaccurately assessed the national consensus against
executing the mentally retarded. She also argues the Court erred when
it unnecessarily discounted the reliability of defining retardation, failed
to accept testimony on mental age, and mistakenly believed sentencers
will consider mental retardation a mitigating factor.
Richard C. Dieter, InternationalPerspectivesOn the Death Penalty:A Costly
Isolationfor the U.S., athttp://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/internationalreport.
html (Oct. 1999).
This report discusses the international trend toward the abolition of the
death penalty and the United States' position as a violator of human
rights. Among the issues discussed is the execution of the mentally
retarded. The report also discusses the costs of the United States' failure
to abide by international law regarding capital cases.
Licia A. Esposito, Note, The Constitutionality of Executing Juvenile and
Mentally Retarded Offenders: A PrecedentialAnalysis and Proposalfor
Reconsideration,31 B.C. L. REV. 901 (1990).
The author examines the evolution of the Supreme Court's definition of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause; looks at Thompson v.
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Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361
(1989); and Penryv. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989); and concludes none
of the Court's approaches adequately addresses the problems ofjuveniles
and the mentally retarded. She argues the Court should adopt a
compelling state interest/least restrictive means approach to determine
the constitutionality of juvenile and mentally retarded offender's death
sentences.
Philip L. Fetzer, Execution of the Mentally Retarded:A Punishment Without
Justification,40 S.C. L. REV. 419 (1989).
After a discussion on the treatment of the mentally retarded, the author
looks at the application of the Eighth Amendment to retarded offenders.
Throughout the article, the author compares the mentally retarded to
juveniles and the mentally ill. He argues executing the mentally retarded
has no deterrent value because they have poor impulse control and
underdeveloped concepts of causation and moral blameworthiness. He
asserts social outrage cannot justify their execution because they cannot
appreciate the causal connection between their actions and their death
sentence. Thus, he concludes, retribution does not justify the execution
of the mentally retarded. He argues the death penalty is excessive and
out of proportion to the crime for mentally retarded offenders because of
their lesser moral guilt. He proposes methods to reduce the numbers of
mentally retarded offenders subject to capital punishment, one being that
a finding of mental retardation creates a conclusive presumption of life
during the sentencing phase.
Timothy W. Floyd, Survey, CriminalProcedure,22 TEX. TECH L. REV. 493
(1991).
This article is a review of Fifth Circuit death penalty cases decided
between June 1, 1989 and May 31, 1990. The review discusses the
Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence, with special emphasis on
the Court's decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989). The
review then examines post-Penry claims before the Fifth Circuit and the
Circuit's attempts to decide how much and what kind of mitigating
evidence is required for a valid Penry claim.
Robert P. Gritton, Comment, Capital Punishment: New Weapons in the
Sentencing Process, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 423 (1990).
This comment looks at the Supreme Court's approach to the death
penalty in light of Penryv. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989); Stanford v.
Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); and South Carolinav. Gathers,490 U.S.
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805 (1989). The author gives a brief analysis of the three cases. In
Penry, he concludes the Court should have employed a heightened
scrutiny test to determine the applicability of the death penalty in light
of the varying degrees of retardation. He further concludes that pursuant
to common law and judicial economy, the appropriate minimum age for
capital punishment should be fifteen. He finds deterrence is not served
by executing juveniles and the mentally retarded because neither
performs a cost-benefit analysis before acting. He finds retribution is
served only if society has placed an increased value on vengeance and
lowered the threshold for the acceptability of retribution.
Patricia Hagenah, Note, Imposing the Death Sentence On Mentally Retarded
Defendants: The Case of Penry v. Lynaugh, 59 UMKC L. REV. 135 (1990).
This note examines Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and
concludes the Court erred in failing to protect mentally retarded
offenders form the death penalty. The author argues the dissent's
rejection of a proportionality review is improper because limiting the
proportionality review to punishments condemned in 1789 leaves the
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment static, and by focusing solely on
legislation to determine the evolving standards of decency means
political majorities define the Eighth Amendment. She asserts Justice
O'Connor erred in advocating an approach where mental retardation is
a mitigating factor. She argues the sentencer may not properly weigh
mental retardation as a mitigating factor because it may offer greater
weight as an aggravating factor.
HERBERT H. HAINES, AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1996).
This book discusses the anti-death penalty movement in America from
1972 to 1994. The author examines the efforts to develop a multi
organizational network to attack the death penalty. He discusses the
involvement and contributions of Amnesty International. Amnesty
International pushed for incremental attacks on the death penalty and
pursued studies revealing the lack of public support for executions of
those under eighteen, those with a history of mental illness, and the
mentally retarded. The book reports the success of legislation
prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded.
Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Beyond Penry: The Remedial Use of the Mentally
RetardedLabel in Death Penalty Sentencing, 59 UMKC L. REV. 17 (1990).
The author argues a class-wide prohibition on the execution of mentally
retarded offenders is necessary to ensure fair and equitable treatment in
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the criminal justice system. He argues that in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 392 (1989), the Court ignores the nature and consequences of
mental retardation. He looks at the damage that the label of mental
retardation causes. He argues proportionality demands diminished
culpability for mentally retarded offenders, and he finds that the
traditionaljustifications of deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution fail
when applied to the mentally retarded. He finds Penry's individualized
mitigation to be inadequate because the mentally retarded are unable to
utilize the full range of procedural protections offered by the legal system
due to their diminished capabilities, and thus are punished
disproportionately. He further asserts jurors stereotype and cannot
properly give weight to mental retardation as a mitigating factor.
Linda L. Hinton, Case Note, Criminal Law, 39 Drake L. Rev. 921
(1989/1990).
This is a case note that analyzes Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989).
The author concludes that any expansion of the Eighth Amendment
protection to any one class of persons is doubtful.
Denis W. Keyes and William J. Edwards, Mental Retardationand the Death
Penalty: CurrentStatus of Exemption Legislation, 21 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 687 (1997).
This article looks at post-Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989),
legislation prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded. The
authors examine the Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, New Mexico, New York, Tennessee, Washington,
and federal government statutes. They conclude that with these new
statutes prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded offenders, the
Supreme Court should reverse its decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
392 (1989).
Denis W. Keyes, et al., Mitigating Mental Retardation in Capital Cases:
Findingthe "Invisible" Defendant, 22 MENTAL &PHYSICAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 529 (1998).
The authors look at the nature and extent of the problem of the mentally
retarded in capital cases. They define mental retardation and provide a
guide for defense attorneys to use. They conclude that mental retardation
is often not explored as a mitigating factor and that the culpability of a
mentally retarded defendant is such that the death penalty should not be

imposed.
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BARRY LATZER, DEATH PENALTY CASES: LEADING U.S. SUPREME COURT
CASES ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1998).

This book contains excerpts of the Supreme Court cases on the death
penalty. It also contains a brief overview of the history of the Eighth
Amendment, capital laws and procedures, and the capital punishment
debate. The appendix contains facts and figures on murder and the death
penalty. Cases discussed that are relevant to this bibliography include
Stanfordv. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Fordv. Wainwright,477 U.S.
399 (1986); and Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989).

James S. Liebman and Michael J. Shepard, Guiding Capital Sentencing
Discretion Beyond the "Boiler Plate": Mental Disorderas a Mitigating
Factor,66 GEO. L.J. 757 (1978).
This article examines five Supreme Court decisions handed down on July
2, 1976: Gregg v. Georgia,428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffittv. Florida,428
U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Woodson v. North
Carolina,428 U.S. 280 (1976); and Roberts v. Louisiana,431 U.S. 633
(1976). The authors distill from these cases a doctrinal framework of the
Eighth Amendment. They assert a statute attempting to enumerate
exclusive mitigatory factors is unconstitutional and that a defendant has
a right to jury instructions on guided individualization. The authors
apply their doctrinal framework to the treatment of mental illness as a
mitigation and conclude a mentally disordered offender should receive
mitigatory consideration. In order to determine the degree of mitigation,
they propose a four-factor analysis. They apply this analysis to the
mentally retarded and the sociopath and conclude there is a compelling
case for reducing a death sentence for a mentally retarded offender.
Edward Miller, Note, Executing Minors and the Mentally Retarded: The
Retribution and Deterrence Rationales, 43 RUTGERS L. REv. 15 (1990).
This note looks at Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), and Penry
v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and concludes the Supreme Court erred
in its assessment of the deterrence and retributive values of sentencing
juveniles and the mentally retarded to death. The author gives a
background of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, focusing on the
evolution of the deterrence and retributive analysis. He criticizes
Justices O'Connor and Scalia for abandoning the penological purpose
test in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). He looks at Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and argues Justice O'Connor distorts the
penological purpose test. The author then performs his own analysis and
finds the characteristics of juveniles and the mentally retarded preclude
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the required level of culpability necessary for the death penalty. He
argues this lesser culpability does not fulfill the goal of retribution. He
also argues that the poor impulse control, lack of strategic thinking, and
difficulty seeing their mortality means it is unlikely the goal of
deterrence is served by executing juveniles and the mentally retarded.
Moratorium 2000, at http://www.moratorium2000.org/about us/index.lasso
(last visited Oct. 1, 2000).
This Web site is by a nonprofit, nonpolitical organization dedicated to
establishing a moratorium on the death penalty. This site contains
reports on the execution of the mentally retarded.
National Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty, at http://www.ncadp.org (last
visited Oct. 1, 2000).
This Web site is by a coalition of organizations and individuals who are
committed to abolishing the death penalty. The site contains several fact
sheets concerning various aspects of the death penalty. One such fact
sheet discusses the execution of the mentally retarded. The fact sheet
gives facts and figures on the mentally retarded on death row and the
numbers of executions.
John Parry, The Rehnquist - Scalia Court Takes Hold - Part 1: The Death
Penalty and Abortion, 13 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 318
(1989).
This article takes a look at Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and
the dualism reflected in the majority opinion. The author asserts that
although there was narrow consensus in the decision, there was no
consensus in the Court's reasoning. He finds Justice Scalia's reasoning
to be the weakest and Justice O'Connor's middle of the road opinion to
be the best reasoned, although weak in that it does not discuss what is an
incapacity to be executed. He believes Justice Brennan's dissent errs in
not requiring an individualized assessment of mental status.
RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1991).

This book on the death penalty is divided into five parts. Part I gives an
overview of capital punishment. Part II discusses the legal challenges to
the death penalty pre-Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), and
discusses legal challenges and reform of the death penalty after Gregg v.
Georgia. This part addresses mitigation evidence such as youth or
mental illness. This part also examines the execution of special groups
such as the mentally ill, mentally retarded, and juveniles. The Supreme
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Court cases of Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Ford v.
Wainwright,477 U.S. 399 (1986); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815
(1988); and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), are discussed.
Part III deals with racial discrimination and arbitrariness. Part IV
discusses arguments for and against the death penalty. Part V looks at
alternatives to capital punishment.
Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal
Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales,or
"DoctrinalAbyss?", 29 ARIz. L. REv. 1 (1987).
The author discusses whether there is any doctrinal consistency in cases
dealing with mentally disabled defendants. He discusses eight cases:
Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Jones v. United States, 463
U.S. 354 (1983); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985); Estelle v. Smith,
451 U.S. 454 (1981); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986);
Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986); Illinois v. Allen, 478 U.S. 364
(1986); and Fordv. Wainwright,477 U.S. 399 (1986). He examines how
the Court has dealt with common elements involving the type of penalty
and crime and type of psychiatric diagnosis. He looks at whether the
justices' positions reflect any themes. He identifies extra-legal principles
that might be guiding the Court. He also examines symbols in the cases.
He concludes there are some doctrinal threads that concern the Court's
fear of executing a truly insane prisoner and shocking the public's
conscience. However, he finds no real doctrinal consistency at this time.
ROBERT PERSKE, DEADLY INNOCENCE? (1995).
The author relates the story of Joe Arridy, a mentally retarded man
executed January 6, 1939. Perske believes Arridy's confession was a
false one and he details the justice system's prejudices and failings
toward the mentally retarded. The book is a strong statement against
executing the mentally retarded.
Robert Perske and Shirley Dicks, The Mentally Retarded and the Justice
System, in YOUNG BLOOD 75 (Shirley Dicks ed., 1995).
This chapter looks at the characteristics of the mentally retarded that lead
to their victimization in the criminal justice system. The authors note the
large number of mentally retarded offenders on death row. They look
specifically at two cases.
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Carol Daugherty Rasnic, The U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court and
CapitalPunishment: Should the U.S.A. Put the DeathPenalty to Death?, 50
N. IR. LEGAL Q. 50 (1999).
This article gives an overview of important death penalty cases. In
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988),
particular it discusses
and Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), concerning juveniles;
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), concerning the insane; and
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), concerning the mentally
retarded.
Juliet L. Ream. Comment, Capital Punishment For Mentally Retarded
Offenders: Is It Morally and ConstitutionallyImpermissible?, 19 Sw. U. L.
REV. 89 (1990).
After discussing the historical foundations and justifications for the death
penalty and the Eighth Amendment, the author considers the similarities
between insanity, youth, and mental retardation. She argues the mentally
retarded should receive the same special treatment as juveniles and the
mentally ill because they too possess a lesser criminal and moral
culpability. Drawing heavily on the American Bar Association's Mental
Health Standards, she proposes guidelines for determining competency
to stand trial and competency for execution for the mentally retarded.
Emily A. Reed, CapitalPunishmentand Offenders with Mental Retardation,
in SOCIETY'S FINAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY AND DISCUSSION OF THE DEATH
PENALTY 21 1(Laura E. Rand ed., 1997).
This chapter discusses why mentally retarded offenders should never be
sentenced to death. The author begins with a definition of mental
retardation. She follows with an explanation of the characteristics of the
mentally retarded. She finds these characteristics prevent the mentally
retarded from being fully culpable for their criminal actions, and thus
they should be ineligible for the death penalty. She argues the Court
erred in its assessment of a national consensus in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492
U.S. 392 (1989). She finds society does not want the mentally retarded
executed. She argues individualized sentencing is inadequate to protect
the mentally retarded since evidence of mental retardation for mitigation
purposes is also used for aggravating purposes. She rebuts arguments
about multiple claims overwhelming the justice system and arguments
concerning main streaming.
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Dee Reid, Unknowing Punishment, STUDENT LAW., May 1987, at 18.
This article looks at the problems mentally retarded offenders possess
that may lead to large numbers of them residing on death row. The
article notes the mentally retarded often confess to crimes they did not
commit and that they do not understand their civil rights. Another
problem the article recognizes, is that the courts, psychologists,
psychiatrists, and defense attorneys often do not recognize mental
retardation. Experts quoted in the article assert mental retardation can
interfere with the ability to make appropriate judgments, resist negative
influences, and understanding the nature and consequences of an action.
The author argues most state laws regarding competency address insanity
and not mental retardation. Additionally, the article notes, the mentally
retarded have poor communications skills, poor recall, and do not
understand the implications of a guilty plea. Furthermore, raising the
issue of mental retardation may result in its being used against the
defendant. The article provides the case summaries of five mentally
retarded offenders on death row.
Cecil A. Rhodes, The Killing of John Paul Penry: Are General Social
Deterrence or Retributive Purposes Served in Executing Mentally
HandicappedDefendants?, 21 LINCOLN L. REv. 65 (1993).
This article looks at the national consensus condemning the execution of
mentally retarded criminal defendants. The author points out society,
courts, and the legislatures have recognized the difference, mistreatment,
and discrimination associated with the mentally retarded. He argues that
in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), there was ample objective
evidence to show a national consensus against executing the mentally
retarded. He asserts that because of Penry'smental retardation and low
level of culpability, killing him made no contribution to the penological
goals of deterrence and retribution. The author concludes the execution
of the mentally retarded violates the Eighth Amendment and that the
Court has abandoned its role in our constitutional system.
Dian Sharon Rubanoff, Note, Sentencing the Mentally Retardedto Die:Mercy
in the Hands of the Jury, 11 WH1TTIER L. REV. 845 (1990).
This note looks at Penryv. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and concludes
that allowing consideration of mental retardation as a mitigating factor
may not adequately protect mentally retarded offenders. The author
argues the Penry decision was foreseeable from past decisions and that
regardless of the type of mitigating evidence, capital sentencing juries
must be given a method of considering all legitimate mitigating evidence.
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In examining the issue of a blanket prohibition on executing the mentally
retarded, the author argues it is difficult to show a national consensus
against executing the mentally retarded. She finds Justice O'Connor's
belief in the proportionality doctrine significant, but notes O'Connor has
never found the punishment excessive under that doctrine. The author
argues the rise of prejudice and fear among jury members may mean
juries are incapable of giving mental retardation its proper mitigating
effect.
David L. Rumley, Comment, A License to Kill: The CategoricalExemption
of the Mentally RetardedFrom the Death Penalty, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1299
(1993).
After looking at the historical treatment of mental deficiencies, the
characteristics of persons with mental retardation, and I.Q. tests, the
author concludes a person's I.Q. should not be proof of mental
retardation. He argues mental retardation does not mean an individual
is less culpable. He suggests the following guidelines when dealing with
a mentally retarded defendant: the defendant must be found mentally
culpable at the time of the offense, the defendant must be competent to
stand trial, the trier-of-fact must find beyond a reasonable doubt every
element of the crime, the sentencer must find beyond a reasonable doubt
one statutorily defined aggravating circumstance, and the defendant must
understand the impending execution.
Eric L. Shwartz, Comment, Penry v. Lynaugh: "Idiocy" and the Framers'
Intent Doctrine, 16 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 315 (1990).
This case comment discusses Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989).
After discussing the facts and opinions of the case, the author argues the
Court erred in applying the framers' intent doctrine. He asserts that a
close reading of the historical record from the sixteenth through the
eighteenth century would find Penry would likely have been considered
an "idiot" and thus incapable of being executed. He criticizes the
Court's reliance on nineteenth and twentieth century classifications of
"idiocy." He further argues that the penological goals of retribution and
deterrence are not served by executing the mentally retarded.
Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker, Defending CategoricalExemptions to the
Death Penalty: Reflections on the ABA's Resolutions Concerning the
Execution of Juveniles and Persons With Mental Retardation, 61 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1998, at 89.
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In this article the authors argue juveniles and the mentally retarded
should be exempted from the death penalty. They discuss Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence and the weaknesses of the proportionality
analysis. They argue the American Bar Association and others seeking
to ban executions of juveniles and the mentally retarded should focus
their arguments on the following doctrinal requirements: narrowing the
class eligible, channeling the discretion of capital sentencers, ensuring
the consideration of mitigating factors, and securing heightened
reliability.
VictorL. Streib, Executing Women, Children,and the Retarded:Second Class
Citizens in CapitalPunishment,in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 201 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998).
This chapter looks at three frequently excluded classes from capital
punishment: women, children, and the mentally retarded. The author
examines the social policies and realities behind the reluctance to
execute people in these groups. As part of his analysis, the author gives
statistics on members of each group on death row or executed. He also
gives historical backgrounds. The policies he looks at are culpability;
legislative enactments; jury sentences; public opinion polls; and the
penological goals of incapacitation, deterrence, and retribution. He
concludes that the reasons for screening out juveniles and the mentally
retarded are more justifiable than those for women.
Mitigating
Peggy M. Tobolowsky, What Hath Penry Wrought?
Circumstancesand the Texas DeathPenalty, 19 Am. J. Crim. L. 345 (1992).
This article looks at Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and the Texas
response. The author focuses primarily on Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S.
392 (1989). In addressing Penry claims, the author notes the Texas court
has only given relief for factual circumstances presenting mitigating
evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse. The author reviews
the new Texas death penalty scheme and concludes it passes
constitutional muster by allowing individualized consideration of the
defendant's character, background, and circumstance of the offense, and
specifically by addressing Penry concerns.
ROBERT H. THOMAS AND JOHN D. HUTCHESON, JR., GEORGIA RESIDENTS'

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE DEATH PENALTY, THE DISPOSITION OF JUVENILE
OFFENDERS, AND RELATED ISSUES (1986).

This report provides the findings of a sample of over 900 Georgia
residents. Forty-one questions were asked concerning: the crime rate and
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judicial system; imprisonment and the death penalty; judicial process,
imprisonment, and the death penalty for juvenile offenders; fairness of
the death penalty; and alternatives to the death penalty. The survey
found 66% of Georgia residents believe the mentally retarded should not
receive the death penalty.
University of Alaska Anchorage Justice Center, Focus On the Death Penalty,
at http://www.uaa.alaska.edu/just/death/issues.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2000).
This Web site attempts to provide links to resources from both sides of
-the death penalty debate. This particular area of the site addresses
specific issues. In addition to information on deterrence; retribution and
justice for murder victims; the innocent; limiting appeals and habeas
corpus reform; costs of the death penalty; alternative sentencing;
fairness; moratorium; cruel and unusual punishment; and women, the site
provides links to statistical information and cases concerning juveniles,
the mentally retarded, and the mentally ill.
Salvador C. Uy, Note, From the Ashes of Penry v. Lynaugh: The Diminished
Intent Approach to the Trial and Sentencing of the Mentally Retarded
Offender, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 565 (1990).
The author examines Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989), and
concludes the Supreme Court did not properly understand the nature and
effects of mental retardation. The note first looks at the definition of
mental retardation and then at the Penry Court's treatment of mitigation.
The author next examines the Eighth Amendment analysis in the
decision. He argues the Court incorrectly confused mental illness with
mental retardation and erroneously concluded the insanity defense
statutes would protect the mentally retarded. He discusses why
diminished capacity as it currently stands does not protect the mentally
retarded defendant and proposes a diminished intent statute that will
protect the mentally retarded from execution.
William K. Wetzonis, CapitalPunishmentforMentallyRetardedDefendants:
A Boundary Forthe Eighth Amendment Is Drawn, 34 HOw. L.J. 651 (1991).
This article begins with an analysis of Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392
(1989), and concludes the death penalty should not be applied to
mentally retarded defendants. The author points to the problems
identifying the mentally retarded offender and the mentally retarded
defendant's lack of mens rea. He compares treatment of the mentally
retarded to juveniles and the mentally ill and finds the Supreme Court's
conflicting views to be misdirected. Finally, he argues the penological
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goals of deterrence and retribution are not served by executing the
mentally retarded.
Virginia G. Wilson, Note, Penry v. Lynaugh: Mentally Retarded Defendants
and the Death Penalty, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 345 (1990).
After discussing mental retardation and death penalty jurisprudence, the
author examines Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 392 (1989). She concludes
the Court correctly held the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit
execution of the mentally retarded. She argues legislation and court
decisions show a trend toward treating the mentally retarded as ordinary
adults. She believes a blanket prohibition would violate the penological
justification of retribution. She finds that since the mentally retarded
may possess cognitive disabilities, they may be less culpable, and thus
should have their condition considered as a mitigating factor.

